Th e global power sector is undergoing a clear structural transition as natural gas steadily loses share in electricity generation for the ?fth consecutive year.
according to analysis from the energy think tank Ember, gas generation has continued to grow slightly in absolute terms. Still, its share of the global electricity mix has declined from 23.9% in 2020 to 21.8% in 2025.
this shift is being driven primarily by the rapid expansion of solar and wind power, which are increasingly meeting new electricity demand at lower cost and with faster deployment timelines than fossil fuel-based generation. The data indicates that 61 out of 124 gas-dependent electricity markets have already passed their peak gas generation, including major advanced economies such as the UK, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Key drivers include post-crisis energy security concerns, particularly following geopolitical shocks in 2022 and 2026, improving renewable economics, and the ability of emerging economies to expand electricity access without heavy reliance on gas infrastructure. Declining Role of Gas in the Global Power Mix Natural gas is losing momentum in the electricity sector despite continued demand growth. Gas share in global electricity has declined every year since 2020 Growth in gas generation (2021- 2025) is roughly half the pace of 2016-2020 In 2025, gas added only 38 TWh, contributing just 5% of new global electricity demand growth While gas is still expanding in some regions, its role as the default ‘bridge fuel’ is increasingly weakening. Solar Power Leads Global Electricity Expansion Solar energy has emerged as the dominant driver of new electricity supply, signi?cantly outpacing gas.
in 2025: Solar generation increased by 636 TWh Gas increased by only 38 TWh Solar grew about 17 times faster than gas Solar contributed roughly threequarters of new electricity demand growth, while gas contributed only about 5% This marks a fundamental shift in which renewable energy is no longer supplementary but the main engine of global electricity expansion. Geopolitical and Economic Forces Reshaping Energy Systems The decline of gas is being reinforced by structural economic and geopolitical changes.
energy security shocks, particularly the 2022 Russia-Ukraine con?ict and the 2026 Middle East disruptions, exposed vulnerabilities in LNGdependent systems and triggered renewed investment in domestic renewable energy capacity.
at the same time, declining costs of solar and wind have strengthened their competitiveness.
in many regions, domestically produced clean electricity is now seen as more stable, faster to deploy, and less exposed to global price volatility than gas. Regional Trends and Market Divergence G7 Economies: Transition Past Peak Gas Several advanced economies have already passed structural peaks in gas generation. Four G7 members- the UK, Germany, Italy, and Japan- are among the countries that have reached this milestone.
in 2025: G7 gas generation fell by 50 TWh Renewable generation increased by 123 TWh Clean electricity now exceeds fossil-based generation across the G7 United States: A Global Outlier The United States remains the largest single driver of global gas generation, accounting for around 26% of global output in 2025, and has contributed signi?cantly to global gas growth over the past decade.
emerging Economies: Low Gas Dependence Despite rapid demand growth, several large emerging economies have limited reliance on gas: India: Gas share declined from 12.6% (2010) to 2.3% (2025) Brazil: Fell from 13.7% peak (2014) to 7.3% China: Maintains ~3% gas share despite massive demand expansion These trends re?ect a broader pattern of electri?cation driven increasingly by renewables rather than fossil gas. Conclusion Global electricity systems are approaching a decisive in?ection point in gas generation. While gas remains part of the energy mix, its strategic role is diminishing as countries prioritize affordability, energy security, and domestic generation capacity.
the evidence points to a long-term trajectory where clean electricity- particularly solar and wind- becomes the primary driver of global power system growth, gradually marginalizing gas in both developed and emerging markets.Launched in Thailand in 2019, the People’s Solar Power Campaign set an ambitious goal: generating 100 MWh from residential rooftop solar installations in its ?rst year, as part of the country’s broader target of 1,000 MWh by 2028. Yet despite strong public interest, with two-thirds of homebuyers expressing interest in the initiative, actual adoption remained extremely limited. Participating households added just 3 MWh in 2019.
affordability was an issue, but not the only barrier.
the role of behavioural factors in shaping adoption decisions also mattered. Many households had a limited understanding of rooftop solar, in?uencing how they perceived its bene?ts and risks.
as a result, even interested households did not follow through.
adoption was further held back by limited visibility, with many preferring to ‘wait and see’ until solar installations became more common in their communities. How behavioural insights improve policy uptake Thailand’s experience highlights that well-designed energy transition policies can still fall short of the goals if they do not duly consider how people make decisions.
insights from behavioral science, including nudges, help bridge this gap by focusing on cognitive and psychological aspects. ‘Default settings’ can strongly in?uence behaviour. People often stick with the easiest or pre-selected option, especially when decisions are complex or unfamiliar.
in Switzerland, setting renewable energy as the default option led more than 80% of 200,000 households to remain on green electricity, despite higher costs.
the example illustrates how choice architecture can encourage greener decisions without restricting consumer choice. ‘Framing’ shapes how people perceive costs and responsibilities associated with transition-related policies.
in India, surrendering LPG subsidies was presented as an act of national solidarity, prompting around one million households to voluntarily give up the subsidies. Similarly, in Thailand, linking fuel taxes to visible climate impacts such as ?oods and droughts helped reduce fuel consumption by 5% among personal car drivers. ‘Social norms’ can be equally powerful. In the Republic of Korea, public buses in Seoul carried the message ‘Energy we save together, one nuclear power plantwe reduce together’ as part of its One Less Nuclear Power Plant initiative. By emphasising collective responsibility, the initiative contributed to a 4% reduction in electricity consumption between 2011 and 2014. ‘Simpli?cation’ can help translate interest into action.
even when households are motivated to act, complex procedures and uncertainty can prevent follow-through.
in Uganda, when households received clear, practical guidance on purchasing reliable solar systems and support to set savings goals, they were 31 percentage points more likely to take the ?rst step. In Malaysia, the introduction of a clear, principle-based climate taxonomy reduced ambiguity and encouraged more climate-aligned bank lending. Together, these experiences show that even small adjustments in policy design and communication can signi?cantly in?uence public uptake of transitionrelated policies. Recognising this potential, governments are increasingly seeking ways to apply these approaches more systematically.
institutionalising behavioural insights For policymakers, behavioural interventions can deliver signi?cant impact at relatively low cost.
one study in the United States found that sending households simple energy reports comparing their electricity use to that of their neighbours generated energy savings of 27.3 kWh for every dollar spent. Governments are therefore increasingly formalising the use of behavioural tools. By 2023, more than 50 behavioral insight units were operating worldwide (Figure 1). Dedicated teams can test policy designs, identify decisionmaking barriers early, and re?ne reforms before scaling them nationally. Importantly, this does not necessarily require creating entirely new institutions; behavioural approaches can be integrated progressively within existing government structures. Figure 1. Number of new government-af?liated BIUs established each year, 2009-2023 Source: Data are derived from the OECD Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (OPSI) BIU database and include supplementary government BIUs identi?ed through additional desk research. Note: Coverage re?ects voluntary disclosure and is not exhaustive. Results should be interpreted as indicative. Governments can start small and build capacity over time.
the United Kingdom’s Behavioural Insights Team began as a small unit within the Cabinet Of?ce before expanding globally, while Canada progressively integrated behavioural science functions across government through Impact Canada. Institutionalising behavioural insights allows governments to move beyond one-off experiments towards more systematic policy implementation.
in Asia and the Paci?c, however, the institutionalisation of behavioral science remains uneven. Most dedicated units are concentrated in higher-income economies such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Singapore. By contrast, in countries such as China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam, the application of behavioural science remains limited to pilot initiatives or research partnerships, rather than being systematically embedded in policymaking processes.
as countries accelerate energy transition reforms, people-centred approaches can help close the gap between policy ambition and real-world adoption.
the Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Paci?c 2026 goes beyond identifying which transition policies should be adopted and explores how insights from political economy and behavioural science can be leveraged to support their implementation.
ultimately, successful energy transitions will depend not only on sound economics and strong institutions, but also on policies designed around how people actually make decisions