Category: Sunday Standard

Every June, the world erupts in rainbow colours. Corporate logos transform overnight. Development partners such as UN family and International Cooperations issue carefully worded statements about diversity and inclusion. Social media fills with declarations of allyship that, come July, quietly disappear.

Pride Month arrives dressed in celebration. But for many ordinary LGBTIQ people in Botswana, it arrives dressed in something far more complicated; a question we cannot stop asking ourselves:

What, exactly, are we celebrating?

I ask this not as an outsider looking in. I ask it as someone who stood at the heart of one of Botswana’s most defining moments in the struggle for queer rights, as one of the litigants in the landmark Thuto Rammoge case against the Government of Botswana, the case that compelled the state to legally recognise LEGABIBO after it had refused to do so simply because the organisation represented lesbian, gay and bisexual people.

I was in those courtrooms. I know what hope felt like in those rooms. And I know what it feels like now, over a decade after the Thuto Rammoge judgment, and years after the decriminalisation ruling, to still be waiting for that hope to reach the people it was supposed to free.

Botswana has, without question, made historic strides. Our courts have delivered progressive rulings that would be remarkable in any context on this continent. In 2019, the High Court decriminalised same-sex relations, striking down colonial-era provisions that criminalised intimacy between consenting adults. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision, affirming that human dignity cannot be selective. Our judiciary has shown genuine constitutional courage, repeatedly and publicly. These were not small victories. They were seismic. They changed the legal architecture of this country, and they deserve to be named as such.

But here is the uncomfortable truth that my extensive years of working with communities; in homes, in clinics, in community halls, in government offices and in international development agencies has taught me: a right that exists only on paper is not a right. It is a promise the state made and has not kept.

Today, many queer people are still navigating rejection at home. Many still fear violence. Many are still denied jobs and quality, non-discriminatory healthcare not because the law permits it but it does not but because no institution is actively ensuring the law is enforced. Many still sit silently at family gatherings where pastors and relatives casually preach hatred in the name of morality. Many still shrink themselves to survive workplaces, churches, schools and communities that remain hostile because nobody in authority has told those communities that the constitution applies here too.

The law decriminalised queer existence. But it did not and cannot on its own decriminalise queer people in the minds and hearts of society. That second transformation requires something the courts alone cannot deliver: intentional, sustained implementation.

And that is precisely what has been missing.

Decriminalisation without implementation is like building a road that leads nowhere. The infrastructure exists. But the people it was meant to serve cannot get through.

We know from decades of human rights practice across Africa and globally that legal reform is the beginning of the journey, not the destination. The moment a law changes, the harder work begins: training healthcare workers to treat queer patients with dignity; sensitising police officers who are often the first point of contact for queer people experiencing violence; ensuring schools have the frameworks to protect LGBTIQ learners; equipping civil society with resources to hold institutions accountable.

This is not abstract theory. This is the practical infrastructure of equality. And Botswana has not built it with any urgency.

Meanwhile, the opposition to queer inclusion is loud, organised and politically motivated. Religious leaders and conservative voices remain deeply invested in policing queer existence. Figures like former Cabinet Minister Biggie Butale have positioned opposition to LGBTIQ rights as a rallying cry. The commentary surrounding ongoing same-sex marriage debates has been deeply revealing, spend even a few minutes in those spaces online and you encounter levels of anger, disgust and obsession directed at queer people that are, candidly, frightening. And perhaps what is most painful is not simply the opposition itself, but the intensity of the hatred.

Which raises a question that I think we are often too polite to ask in public: what is the source of that pain?

Why does the existence of queer people provoke such emotional outrage? Why does another person’s identity feel like a personal attack on people who have never met them? Why do some people experience constitutional equality as though it were an act of aggression against themselves?

These are not legal questions. They are social, psychological and spiritual questions and they point to the reality that homophobia is rarely truly about queer people. It is about fear. Fear of difference. Fear of change. Fear generated by rigid, inherited frameworks of masculinity, gender and morality. It is often unresolved anxiety projected outward and it is consistently weaponised by those who find political or religious power in keeping communities divided.

Understanding this does not excuse it. But it is important, because it tells us that legal change alone was never going to be sufficient. You cannot litigate prejudice into extinction. You have to meet communities where they are, engage them honestly, and rebuild understanding from the ground up. That is the work. Long, slow, unglamorous work and it requires government, civil society, institutions and ordinary citizens to all be part of it.

True equality is not measured by what courts declare. It is measured by whether a queer child can grow up without shame.

I want to be honest about where I am sitting emotionally as I write this, because I think honesty is what this moment demands.

For the first time in a long time, I carry real hope. President Advocate Duma Boko has, throughout his public life, stood with minorities, defended constitutional freedoms and spoken about the dignity of all people including queer people. For many LGBTIQ persons in Botswana, this matters enormously. Leadership that recognises your humanity changes the emotional atmosphere of a country. It signals to institutions that they are expected to follow. It signals to communities that equality is not optional.

Perhaps, for the first time, many queer people in this country are beginning to imagine futures beyond mere survival. And that imagination and the ability to plan, to dream, to consider what a full life might look like is itself a kind of justice.

But hope is not a policy. And good intentions at the top do not automatically translate into changed conditions at the bottom. The gap between progressive leadership and transformed lived realities must be bridged deliberately, with resources, with accountability mechanisms, with a national plan that treats LGBTIQ inclusion not as a politically sensitive afterthought but as a constitutional obligation.

That plan does not yet exist. And so we must name that absence.

Botswana now stands at a crossroads that we have, frankly, been standing at for too long. We can continue congratulating ourselves for our progressive courts while doing nothing to translate those victories into changed conditions. Or we can begin the harder, more necessary work of changing institutions, building social support structures, funding community education and ensuring that every organ of the state understands that the constitution it swore to uphold applies to every single citizen, without exception.

Because this is what equality actually looks like in practice: a queer child in a rural village grows up without shame. A lesbian woman can rent a home without discrimination. A gay man can walk into a clinic without humiliation. A trans person can exist without becoming a spectacle. A queer couple can plan a future together without negotiating their own safety at every step.

That was the Botswana many of us were fighting for when we walked into those courtrooms. It is the Botswana my late Best friend and Comrade Thuto Rammoge was hoping and fighting for. It is the Botswana we have not yet built.

Pride is not simply a celebration. It is a reckoning. It is the refusal to pretend we have arrived when we clearly have not.

This is why Pride Month still matters , not because we have fully arrived, but precisely because we have not. It matters because visibility remains an act of courage in a country where queer people still navigate daily hostility. It matters because somewhere, a young person in a small village in Botswana needs to know they are not alone and that their country’s constitution says they deserve to be here just as fully as anyone else.

But Pride must also be a moment of unflinching honesty. Honest about the gap between our legal progress and the lives people are actually living. Honest about the work that has not been done. Honest about the fact that celebrating legal victories while people suffer is a form of dishonesty; comfortable for those of us who can afford to celebrate, but meaningless for those still waiting.

Botswana’s democracy has proven it can produce progressive law. The question this Pride Month is whether it is ready to do the harder thing: produce justice.

Not justice in theory. Justice in daily life. Justice you can feel.

That is what we were fighting for. And that fight is not over.

Hundreds of former Mupane Gold Mine workers moved a step closer to recovering unpaid salaries and benefits after the Court of Appeal cleared the way for the sale of the mine’s assets, overturning a High Court ruling that had temporarily halted the transaction.

The Botswana Mine Workers Union (BMWU) welcomed the decision, saying it restores momentum to a process that could unlock payments to workers and other creditors following the mine’s closure and subsequent liquidation.

BMWU president Joseph Tsimako said the ruling was a significant breakthrough for more than 500 former employees, including workers retained during the mine’s care-and-maintenance phase after operations were suspended in 2024.

‘This is a positive development because the mine has been under care and maintenance for a long time, and the prospective buyer had already indicated a willingness to settle obligations owed to creditors and former miners,’ Tsimako said.

The proposed sale would see Nova Africa Joint Venture acquire the mine’s assets for P21.5 million. According to the union, the transaction would allow the liquidator to continue efforts to conclude the sale process and begin addressing outstanding claims.

Tsimako said the union initially pushed for liquidation after workers went for months without pay while the mine remained non-operational. He argued that the legal dispute that followed only prolonged uncertainty for employees already facing severe financial hardship.

Many former workers are still servicing loans and supporting families despite having gone without salaries for extended periods, he said.

The dispute arose after the High Court granted an interim interdict blocking the sale following legal action involving liquidator Kopanang Thekiso and Nova Africa Resources, trading as Aone Commodities DMCC Joint Venture.

Creditors are collectively owed more than P345 million, including approximately P49 million owed to workers represented by BMWU.

The union said it will now engage both the liquidator and the prospective buyer to establish timelines for settling outstanding payments and bringing closure to one of Botswana’s most closely watched mining insolvencies.

Foreign travellers, investors and business people heading to Botswana will now dig deeper into their pockets after government introduced sweeping new visa charges in what is likely to spark debate over the country’s openness to tourism and investment.

In regulations signed recently, Minister of Labour and Home Affairs, Pius Mokgware has unveiled a new visa fee structure that dramatically increases the cost of entering Botswana for work, business, study and tourism.

The new Immigration (Visa) (Amendment) Regulations, 2026 replace Schedule 3 of the Immigration (Visa) Regulations and introduce charges ranging from P300 to as high as P3,000 depending on the category and duration of the visa.

Business travellers appear to have taken the hardest hit.

Under the new structure, a single-entry Business Visa valid for up to three months will now cost P1,000, while a multiple-entry business visa for up to one year will cost P2,000. Investors seeking long-term access to Botswana will also pay heavily, with a multiple-entry Investment Visa valid for up to five years now pegged at P3,000.

Tourists, long regarded as a critical pillar of Botswana’s economy, are also not spared. A single-entry Tourist Visa for up to one month will now cost P500, while a multiple-entry tourist visa for up to three months rises to P1,000.

Reports show that the new charges could trigger concern within the tourism industry which has repeatedly warned that high travel costs and restrictive immigration measures risk undermining Botswana’s competitiveness against regional rivals such as South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Business operators are also expected to closely scrutinise the regulations amid ongoing government efforts to attract foreign direct investment and diversify the economy away from diamonds.

Employment visas have also been revised upward. A single-entry Employment Visa for up to three months will cost P300, while a multiple-entry version for the same duration rises to P500.

Dependents of foreign residents will pay P2,500 for a multiple-entry Visitor’s Visa valid for periods exceeding three months up to two years.

Students have not escaped the fee overhaul either. Undergraduate study visas will range from P300 to P500 depending on whether they are single or multiple entry, while graduate students will pay between P700 and P1,000.

The regulations also impose hefty charges on emergency and transit travel. Emergency visas will now cost P1,500, while tour operators and transporters seeking multiple-entry transit visas valid for up to three years will pay P2,500.

Diplomatic and Official visas remain exempt from charges.

Government has not publicly explained the rationale behind the new fees, but the move comes amid mounting pressure on public finances and growing calls for tighter immigration controls.

Critics are likely to question whether the new visa regime could discourage visitors and investors at a time when Botswana is battling sluggish economic growth, youth unemployment and declining mineral revenues.

Lawyers representing Bakang Seretse have warned the state that they will launch an application for a permanent stay of execution at the High Court if the Regional Magistrate Court does not agree with them Thabo Malambane – Deputy Director in the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) – has no legal authority to prosecute Seretse.

On June 11, Gaborone Regional Magistrate Mareledi Dipate will make a ruling on Seretse’s application for the charges levelled against himself and his co-accused to be dropped as Malambane was not lawfully authorized to draw up and sign the charge sheet or even to prosecute the matter.

In papers filed before court, attorneys Unoda Mack and Kabo Motswagole issued a stern warning to the DCEC and Attorney General that, should Dipate not rule in their favour, they will approach the High Court to have the charges quashed or permanently stayed.

‘We implore the state to abandon these charges. There is no reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed any of the offences,’ warned Motswagole and Mack. ‘Kindly treat this letter as a statutory notice that, should you not heed our request, we shall approach the High Court for relief upon lapse of the requisite notice period.’

RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL

The lawyers also accused the DCEC of violating Seretse and his co-accused’s rights to a fair trial by reviving charges related to an investigation that was conducted some 10 years ago.

Investigations into Seretse, his business partners, Kgori Capital and their dealings with the National Petroleum Fund (NPF) commenced in 2016. At the time, the DCEC focused on a consultancy and advisory services contract that government had signed with Basis Point Capital in December 2015. In executing that contract, Basis Point Capital sub-contracted Kgori Capital to discharge some of its obligations.

In 2017, Seretse, Sharifa Noor, Alphonse Ndzinge, Kgori Capital and Kgori Holdings were charged with money laundering, stealing by agent, forgery of an official document and conspiracy to defraud government. Specifically, Seretse and his co-accused were accused of issuing a false official document instructing Kgori Capital to pay Kgori Holdings P31, 360 000.00 for delivery of a revenue collection and management system to the NPF. The state also alleged the group submitted a false P4 million maintenance claim to the Department of Energy and laundered money through a series of transactions involving suspected proceeds of crime.

An earlier statement from the DCEC claimed, ‘The funds were suspected to have been derived from defrauding government. These transactions were intended to conceal, disguise or transfer the illicit proceeds.’

All the charges were ultimately quashed by the Extension II Magistrate Court in December 2020, only to be reinstated by Malambane in March 2026. In papers filed before court, Seretse’s lawyers accused the DCEC of violating his right to be tried fairly and within a reasonable time.

‘Initiating the charges in 2026 was highly prejudicial as the accused are being subjected to double jeopardy. As such, they are entitled to relief,’ argued the lawyers.

PERMANENT STAY OF PROSECUTION

According to court documents, Basis Point Capital delivered the online fuel levy management system to the government in 2017 and was paid the P31,360,000.00. The defense notes that the system is currently operating to the satisfaction of officials at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, adding that the millions the DCEC alleges were stolen constituted a legitimate, one-off payment for the infrastructure.

Furthermore, the government has already settled the P4 million maintenance fee claimed by Basis Point Capital in a March 2017 invoice. The Sunday Standard has seen a consent order signed before Justice B. Makhwe on August 3, 2023, confirming this payment.

Motswagole and Mack argue that any administrative questions regarding whether the procurement of the system was properly sanctioned should be directed at government officials, not Seretse and his co-accused. They also highlighted that the validity of the contract between the government and Basis Point Capital was previously reasserted by the Court of Appeal in Kgori Capital vs. The DPP and Another. Given these prior judicial findings, the lawyers argue the state lacks the baseline evidence required to move forward.

‘A person should never be prosecuted in the absence of minimal evidence upon which he might be convicted,’ Mack and Motswagole argued. ‘Accordingly, the charges against the accused persons should not be maintained.’

The defense reiterated that if the state does not abandon the case, the matter will be escalated to the High Court for a permanent stay of proceedings.

For more than two decades the presidency has followed a remarkably predictable path. Vice presidents ascended almost seamlessly to the highest office in Botswana, inheriting incumbency without first seeking a direct mandate from the electorate as presidential candidates. What began as a constitutional mechanism intended to guarantee stability during unexpected transitions gradually evolved into an entrenched political tradition.

That tradition was broken in October 2024 when President Duma Boko led the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) to victory over the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), ending the latter’s nearly six-decade hold on power. The transfer of authority did more than merely change governing parties. It interrupted the succession cycle that had defined Botswana’s executive politics since the late 1990s.

As a result, Vice President Ndaba Gaolathe will not enjoy the advantage that elevated successive Botswana Democratic Party vice presidents to the presidency without first contesting a general election as the leading face of their parties. Unless President Boko were to leave office before the expiry of his constitutional term, Gaolathe would have to face the electorate in a national election if he is ultimately to become president.

The implications are significant because Botswana’s constitutional framework places firm limits on presidential tenure. Section 34 of the Constitution provides that a president may hold office for an aggregate period not exceeding ten years from the date of first assumption of office. Since Boko assumed office following the 2024 general election, his tenure would ordinarily expire around the time of the 2034 elections, assuming he serves the full constitutional period.

That reality sharply contrasts with the political trajectory followed by former presidents Festus Mogae, Lt General Ian Khama and Mokgweetsi Masisi, all of whom reached the presidency through automatic succession while serving as vice president.

The roots of the succession tradition stretch even further back than the post-1998 period. Following the death of founding president Sir Seretse Khama in 1980, then vice president Sir Ketumile Masire automatically succeeded him to the presidency. Masire had served as Seretse Khama’s vice president since September 1966, shortly before independence, making him the country’s longest-serving vice president at the time of succession. Unlike later transitions driven by retirement and political timing, Masire’s ascent occurred under circumstances for which the constitutional succession mechanism had originally been intended, ensuring continuity after the death of a sitting head of state.

Yet it was Masire’s own retirement nearly two decades later that transformed succession from an emergency constitutional safeguard into a recurring political pathway. In 1998 Masire decided to retire before the completion of his term. His departure, coming eighteen months before the 1999 general election, fundamentally reshaped Botswana’s political succession architecture.

At the same time, constitutional amendments introduced in 1997 imposed the ten-year presidential term limit. The combination of the term limit and Masire’s early exit created a political opening that allowed Mogae, then vice president, to assume office and subsequently contest the 1999 elections as incumbent president.

What followed was the institutionalization of a pattern that increasingly appeared less like an emergency constitutional provision and more like an accepted route to State House.

Mogae completed the constitutionally mandated ten years in office before handing power to Khama in 2008. Khama would likewise serve the full constitutional limit before relinquishing office to Masisi in 2018. In each case the sitting vice president inherited incumbency ahead of elections, therefore gaining the political advantages associated with occupying the presidency before seeking an electoral mandate.

That sequence has now been disrupted. Unlike his predecessors in the vice presidency, Gaolathe serves under a president who himself entered office through direct electoral victory rather than succession. Because Boko’s presidency originated at the ballot box rather than through mid-term inheritance, the constitutional clock attached to his tenure aligns naturally with election cycles.

Consequently, unless there is an unexpected resignation or inability to continue in office, there is no automatic pathway for Gaolathe to become president before the next constitutional transition.

In an interview with this publication, former cabinet minister David Magang said Masire’s 1998 decision emerged from both political calculation and personal considerations.

‘By 1998 Masire had come to the conclusion that he wanted to retire,’ Magang said. ‘But he had to retire at the appropriate time. Firstly retire before the then upcoming general elections. And secondly to give his vice president the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the electorate and campaign for the elections.’

Magang said the political environment within the ruling party also favoured transition.

‘Of course the party also felt it was time for him to leave. He was also tired and wanted to do his private business before he could depart this world,’ he said.

Masire’s departure would prove historically consequential. Until then Botswana had experienced relatively straightforward presidential continuity anchored around Seretse Khama and later Masire himself. The constitutional amendment limiting presidential tenure changed the calculations surrounding leadership succession by effectively introducing an expiry date to every presidency.

The vice presidency subsequently became not merely a supporting office but the recognized waiting room to the presidency. Under the arrangement, vice presidents enjoyed prolonged periods of national visibility while serving under sitting presidents. By the time succession occurred, the incoming leader already possessed the advantages of incumbency, state profile and party machinery. The presidency effectively transferred internally before being endorsed externally through elections.

Former president Khama, reflecting on the succession system, said the original rationale behind automatic succession had been understandable under circumstances where a sitting president could no longer continue in office.

‘I was in the BDF when Masire decided to resign then so I don’t know what the arrangement was and why he chose to do that,’ Khama told Sunday Standard. ‘The automatic succession was meant to remove uncertainty about succession in the event a sitting president could no longer continue in office and complete his or her term, so under those circumstances I agreed with it.’

Yet Khama acknowledges that over time the system produced unintended political consequences.

‘But then it had the effect of having presidents changing between elections which became untidy,’ he said. ‘Fortunately with Masisi losing the last elections it had restored national leadership changes aligning with elections.’

Khama said he was pleased that automatic succession had effectively been interrupted following the UDC victory. ‘I am pleased that for now automatic succession has been set aside because its original purpose having been met had started becoming a trend,’ he said.

The 2024 election therefore represented more than a partisan defeat for the BDP. It also restored the alignment between presidential leadership changes and national elections, something that had become increasingly uncommon during the previous quarter century.

The distinction is politically important. Under the earlier succession model, vice presidents could ascend to the presidency without directly fronting a national campaign as presidential candidates beforehand. Once in office, incumbency often strengthened their position heading into elections. In contrast, Gaolathe’s pathway would require direct electoral endorsement unless circumstances unexpectedly trigger constitutional succession provisions.

Khama said while automatic succession had been interrupted, the constitutional mechanism itself remains intact. ‘Automatic succession ended with the UDC victory but it still remains applicable should the need arise for it to be adopted again, then we will be back to the same situation that preceded the victory,’ he said.

Botswana’s Constitution still provides for the vice president to assume office if the presidency becomes vacant due to death, resignation or incapacity. What has changed is the political environment surrounding its use. For the first time in decades a sitting vice president occupies office under a president whose constitutional tenure is naturally synchronized with the electoral calendar. That alignment significantly narrows the prospect of succession occurring before elections. Within the BDP era, succession planning often revolved around identifying and positioning the next vice president as heir apparent. The office became both a training ground and launching platform for future presidents. The expectation of eventual succession shaped internal party dynamics, factional calculations and cabinet appointments.

Under the present arrangement, the political calculus may become less predictable. If Boko serves until the expiry of his constitutional term in 2034, the UDC would have to determine its future leadership through processes more directly tied to electoral politics rather than constitutional inheritance alone. Gaolathe’s prospects would depend not merely on occupying the vice presidency but also on his ability to secure party support and ultimately national endorsement at the polls.

That represents a substantial departure from the political rhythm that characterised Botswana between 1998 and 2024.

Khama suggested reforms that could prevent repeated mid-term transitions in future.

‘I think to ensure we don’t end up with ongoing changes of leadership through automatic succession should the need arise, that rather a vice president who takes over through automatic succession should rather finish the term of his predecessor,’ he said.

‘Then at the next election if he or she wins, then their ten years starts from that point being now their own tenure aligned with elections.’

The UDC victory did not merely remove the BDP from power. It interrupted a succession formula that had become deeply embedded in the country’s post-1998 political culture. The presidency is now tied directly to electoral outcomes rather than anticipated internal transitions. That shift leaves Gaolathe in a markedly different position from his predecessors.

Mogae inherited office after Masire’s early retirement. Khama inherited office after Mogae reached the constitutional limit of his presidency. Masisi inherited office after Khama similarly completed the maximum period permitted under the Constitution. Each transition occurred before a general election, enabling the incoming leader to contest elections as sitting president.

Gaolathe, by contrast, serves under a president whose constitutional timetable points toward remaining in office until the next natural expiry of presidential tenure. Unless circumstances dramatically change, the vice president’s route to State House would therefore pass through the electorate rather than automatic succession. After more than twenty-five years in which Botswana’s vice presidency functioned as the clearest pathway to the presidency, the political order that once appeared settled has been fundamentally altered.

The long troubled Kanye Major Village Sanitation Schemes project has entered another period of uncertainty after engineering consultants suspended onsite services over unresolved payment disputes with the government. The project, one of the most controversial infrastructure works, now faces further delays and escalating costs.

In a letter seen by this publication (dated 11 May, 2026), Estate Construction (Pty) Ltd, the contractor responsible for the project, informed the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Water and Human Settlements that the engineer had withdrawn all site-based services with immediate effect because of unpaid fees.

The contractor said the engineer’s notice warned that supervision would remain suspended ‘until such a time as the outstanding payment issues are resolved.’

The suspension effectively halts key project functions, including inspections, testing oversight, certification of works and issuance of contractual instructions. Estate Construction said the withdrawal of those services made it impossible to continue the works lawfully and safely.

The development marks the latest setback for a sanitation project that has become synonymous with delays, cost overruns, compensation disputes and allegations of poor planning since construction began nearly a decade ago.

Initially awarded to Estate Construction for about P707 million to P725 million, depending on government reporting periods, the project’s total cost has since surged to between P3.3 billion and P3.6 billion, according to figures presented before Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee.

The project was originally expected to be completed between 2019 and 2020 after a 48 month construction schedule. It has since missed several deadlines and remains incomplete in 2026.

Government officials have attributed the spiralling costs to multiple factors, including geological miscalculations, land compensation disputes, inflation, VAT increases and disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

One of the most contentious issues surrounding the project has been the discovery that initial geotechnical studies significantly underestimated the amount of rock beneath Kanye village. Officials told lawmakers that consultants initially estimated rock density at about 8%, while excavation later revealed hard rock levels approaching 80% to 90% in some sections. The error resulted in extensive blasting operations, redesign work and the costly transportation of backfill material from outside the village.

The Ministry of Water and Human Settlements has acknowledged the error publicly. Minister Onneetse Ramogapi told Parliament last year that the project’s escalation from roughly P700 million to more than P3 billion was linked largely to the rocky terrain and difficulties accessing work sites in unplanned residential areas. The project has also generated widespread frustration among residents whose homes and properties were affected by trenching and pipeline construction.

Government records show more than 1,000 properties were impacted, while compensation costs rose from an initial estimate of P5 million to at least P24 million and later exceeded P37 million, according to various official updates.

Residents in several wards complained of damaged yards, open trenches, disrupted access roads and unfinished sewer connections. More than 1,400 complaints linked to the project were recorded over the years, with hundreds still unresolved by 2025.

The project also attracted the attention of anti-corruption agencies after questions emerged over the scale of the overruns and procurement decisions. Officials told the Public Accounts Committee that the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime was investigating aspects of the project, including allegations of professional negligence connected to the flawed rock assessments.

Government officials have repeatedly denied corruption allegations, maintaining that the overruns were driven primarily by technical and logistical complications rather than fraud.

Even as the project neared completion, technical problems continued emerging. Earlier this year, Water Utilities Corporation officials told councillors in Kanye that some pump station motors had broken down during testing while certain valves installed in the system were found to be substandard and required replacement.

The latest payment dispute now threatens to deepen those difficulties. Estate Construction said unpaid Interim Payment Certificates numbered 118 to 123 have remained outstanding since November 2025. The company warned that without engineering supervision there could be no approvals, testing, commissioning or certification of completed works for payment.

The contractor said the absence of the engineer had also created a vacuum in project administration, including the inability to obtain instructions or determinations required under the contract.

Estate Construction Managing Director Kegone Sebina requested an urgent tripartite meeting involving the government, the engineer and the contractor within 48 hours to stabilise the project, establish interim arrangements for inspections and supervision, and determine how outstanding payments would be settled. Sebina also requested discussions on measures to protect the project programme and address contractual entitlements under FIDIC provisions governing suspension of works and delays. Estate Construction said it remained committed to completing the project.

Botswana’s fiscal savings account has staged its strongest rebound in more than a year, but fresh data suggests government remains heavily reliant on central bank support as the aftershocks of the diamond downturn continue to ripple through public finances.

New figures from the Bank of Botswana show the Government Investment Account (GIA) rose to P1.66 billion in January 2026, nearly doubling from P846 million a month earlier and marking a sharp recovery from the record low of P251.3 million recorded at the end of 2024. The account consists of P1.16 billion held in the Pula Fund and P500 million in the Liquidity Portfolio.

The rebound offers a rare bright spot for government finances after years of depletion. The GIA, which represents government’s share of foreign reserves, once stood at more than P37 billion during the peak years of diamond revenue inflows. Since then, budget deficits, economic shocks and weaker mineral receipts have steadily eroded the account.

Yet the latest figures also reveal the limits of the recovery.

At the same time that the GIA improved, advances from the Bank of Botswana to government remained at P3.2 billion, unchanged from December, indicating that the state is still relying on temporary central bank financing to manage cash flow pressures.

The data points to a government attempting to rebuild savings while simultaneously borrowing to bridge revenue shortfalls.

Meanwhile, Botswana’s foreign assets increased to P53.6 billion in January from P47.4 billion in December, helped by gains across reserve portfolios. The Pula Fund alone rose to P28.8 billion from P27.9 billion.

While the GIA’s recovery is encouraging, it remains a fraction of its historical levels, underscoring how far Botswana’s public finances have yet to travel.

A new academic paper published in the Statute Law Review argues that Botswana’s courts have increasingly dismissed election petitions on procedural technicalities at the expense of substantive justice, undermining public confidence in the country’s electoral dispute system.

The paper, authored by University of Botswana law scholars Baboki Jonathan Dambe and Olebile Daphney Muzila, examines how Botswana’s courts have handled election petitions over the years. It concludes that strict procedural formalism has rendered the constitutional right to challenge election outcomes ‘largely ineffective.’

Titled ‘The absence of judicial discretion to condone non-compliance in election petitions in Botswana: procedural formalism over substantive justice?’, the paper was published this year by Oxford University Press.

The authors argue that although Section 116 of the Electoral Act grants aggrieved parties the right to challenge election outcomes in court. It says many petitions never reach a hearing on their merits because they are dismissed for procedural non-compliance, sometimes involving delays of only a single day or technical defects in filing documents.

The paper points to a series of election cases in which petitions were struck out despite allegations of serious electoral irregularities. Among the cases discussed is Rankgomo v Independent Electoral Commission, arising from the 2004 elections in Gabane North West ward, where 278 votes were reportedly unaccounted for. According to the paper, the petition was dismissed because an application to substitute a deceased petitioner was filed one day late.

The judges in that matter acknowledged the seriousness of the alleged irregularities, with the court noting that the disappearance of nearly one-third of ballots called into question ‘the credibility of the entire process.’ Nevertheless, the petition was dismissed because the court held it lacked the power to condone non-compliance with statutory deadlines.

The paper traces the origins of the strict compliance doctrine to the landmark Court of Appeal decision in Kono v Lekgari, where the court ruled that election petitions must comply meticulously with procedural requirements and that courts lacked discretion to excuse defects or delays. According to the authors, the Kono judgment has since shaped Botswana’s electoral jurisprudence, with subsequent courts repeatedly holding that even minor procedural defects render petitions ‘fatally defective and a nullity.’

The paper further argues that Botswana’s failure to enact dedicated election petition regulations since the Electoral Act was introduced in 1968 has worsened the situation. Without clear procedural rules, the authors contend, courts have relied inconsistently on portions of the Rules of the High Court while excluding others that would ordinarily allow judges to condone minor procedural irregularities.

The article devotes substantial attention to the wave of election petitions filed after the 2019 general elections, in which opposition parties alleged widespread electoral irregularities, including unlawful interference by state institutions and irregularities involving the voters’ roll. Many of those petitions were dismissed on preliminary objections, including failures to file what courts considered proper ‘notices of presentation’ or omissions relating to sureties for legal costs.

The paper acknowledges that some High Court judges have dissented from the majority approach.

Justice Michael Leburu, in one dissenting judgment cited extensively by the authors, warned that excessive procedural formalism risked turning electoral remedies into ‘a mirage and a denial of electoral justice.’ He argued that courts should prioritise substantive justice and avoid dismissing petitions on immaterial technicalities.

Another dissenting judge, Justice Godfrey Nthomiwa, argued that courts should not ignore ‘glaring electoral irregularities’ because of minor procedural defects, particularly in the absence of detailed election regulations.

The paper also criticises the current constitutional framework that bars appeals to the Court of Appeal in parliamentary election petitions. The authors argue that this leaves the High Court as both the court of first and final instance, creating the risk of conflicting decisions among different judges.

As part of its recommendations, the paper calls for urgent reform of Botswana’s electoral laws, including the enactment of comprehensive election petition regulations, the granting of judicial discretion to condone minor procedural lapses and constitutional amendments allowing appeals in election disputes.

The authors compare Botswana’s framework unfavourably with Kenya’s, where election petition rules expressly empower courts to overlook technical non-compliance where no prejudice arises and where appellate review is permitted. The paper concludes that Botswana’s current approach to election petitions elevates procedural compliance above substantive justice, limiting the courts’ ability to assess the merits of electoral disputes and weakening electoral accountability.

The P1.5 billion water tender dispute has exploded into a full-scale legal and possible institutional crisis with the Director General of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), Botlhale Makgekgenene and Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) Chief Executive Officer Tumelo Motsumi now facing possible jail time for contempt of court.

In an affidavit deposed by Kagiso Moremi on behalf of Tawana JV, the applicants are now seeking the joinder of both Makgekgenene and Motsumi into contempt proceedings already before the High Court. The affidavit states that the DCEC Director General ‘is sought to be joined to the contempt application as a further contemnor and orders will be sought against her, including her committal to prison as a sanction for her impugned conduct.’

Papers before the courts show a procurement process involving a multi-billion Pula water tender which Tawana JV says was unlawfully suspended despite clear court rulings in its favour. According to the affidavit by Moremi, the High Court on February 24, 2025 ruled that Tawana JV was ‘entitled to contract placement within 21 days’ in terms of the Public Procurement Regulations. That judgment was later upheld by the Court of Appeal on March 27, 2026 after the respondents lost their appeal. But Tawana JV argues that instead of implementing the judgment, authorities moved to frustrate and undermine the court orders.

‘After the Court of Appeal judgment of 27 March 2026 had been delivered… a series of acts were undertaken by the Accounting Officer, ostensibly in concert with the DCEC and the PPRA, the cumulative effect of which has been to ring-fence the Accounting Officer’s non-compliance,’ Moremi’s affidavit reads. He alleges that on May 7, 2026 the Accounting Officer issued a letter purporting to suspend the procurement process. He argues that the suspension may have been unlawful because Section 107(4) of the Public Procurement Act states that where a public oversight agency is investigating a procurement process, the process cannot be suspended without prior written approval from the PPRA. Moremi now wants the court to compel disclosure of critical procurement records, including what it describes as the ‘original alleged instruction’ from the DCEC directing suspension of the tender process. He argues that the legality of the DCEC’s actions ‘will directly affect the DCEC and its Director General.’

He further states: ‘Any orders made by this Honourable Court in respect of the procurement process, the contempt application, or the interlocutory relief, will necessarily involve a determination of the scope and lawfulness of the Director General of DCEC’s conduct.’ According to Moremi, the PPRA’s role is central because it is the statutory regulator responsible for procurement oversight and records. He adds that; ‘The lawfulness of the purported suspension of the procurement process turns, in part, on whether the PPRA approved the suspension as required by Section 107(4) of the Act.’

He further argues that the PPRA possesses crucial documents and information that could determine whether the suspension was lawful or part of an effort to defeat the implementation of court orders. He insists no prejudice would arise from joining the DCEC and PPRA bosses to the proceedings because they had already participated in correspondence surrounding the disputed suspension. The decision by Tawana JC to launch the interlocutory application and seeking to have DCEC and PPRA senior officials imprisoned follows another application pending before the court by the joint venture to have accounting officer at the Ministry of Water and Human Settlement to be held in contempt of court for failing to implement the High Court and Court of Appeal judgements that favoured the joint venture to be awarded the tender for the water project.

The Court of Appeal has delivered a crushing blow to a company linked to President Duma Boko’s family, throwing out its attempt to block the takeover of the collapsed Mupane gold mine.

In a judgment delivered by Justice Isaac Lesetedi, the Court of Appeal describing the bidder, Ulsan, as a ‘grumpy loser’ with ‘no conceivable right to protect.’ Court of Appeal President justice Tebogo Tau and Court of Appeal judge Justice Lot Moroka concurred.

Dismissing a challenge brought by a company linked to President Duma Boko’s son over the lucrative Mupane mine takeover battle, the Court of Appeal overturned a High Court order that had temporarily stopped the sale of Mupane Gold Mine ‘s assets to Nova Africa Resources and Aone Commodities DMCC Joint Venture in a deal worth US$21.5 million.

The case centred on Ulsan Botswana (Pty) Ltd, a company reportedly linked to President Boko’s son, Andile Tau, through recent corporate appointments. Court papers show the company was registered in May 2025 and later underwent rapid changes in directorship and management structures. This fuelled public scrutiny over its involvement in the high-stakes gold mine takeover.

The Court of Appeal tore apart Ulsan’s arguments and ruled that the company had failed to establish any legal basis to halt the liquidation process.

‘Quite evidently Ulsan was nothing but a grumpy loser with no conceivable right to protect,’ Justice Lesetedi wrote in the judgment.

The court further said the company was ‘intent on frustrating the liquidation process on the back of whimsical grounds.’

Mupane Gold Mining had been placed under final liquidation in February 2025 after failing to pay debts owed to workers represented by the Mineworkers Union. Liquidator Kopanang Thekiso later invited bids for the mine’s assets through a Request for Offers process.

Two bids eventually emerged as frontrunners: Ulsan’s proposal and the Nova Africa JV offer.

According to the judgment, Ulsan offered an upfront payment of just US$500,000, with a conditional package that could potentially rise to US$10 million over several years after further assessments of the mine.

By contrast, Nova Africa JV tabled a straight US$21.5 million offer payable upon completion of the agreement.

The court said Nova Africa’s proposal was ‘clearly much more financially attractive’ and in the best interests of creditors including former mine workers who had gone unpaid for months.

‘The successful bidder’s offer of USD 21.5 million dwarfs Ulsan’s bid,’ the judgment stated.

Ulsan had argued that the liquidation process was unfair because the liquidator allegedly extended the bid submission deadline without informing all bidders equally, thereby benefiting Nova Africa JV.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the official Request for Offers had always listed 15 June 2025 as the closing date and that there had been no unlawful extension.

‘Neither in its affidavits nor at the hearing was Ulsan able to show the wrongfulness of any conduct by the Liquidator in the clarification of the closing date which merely confirms the date..Nor was it able to show any prejudice,’ said Lesetedi.

The judge also ruled that Ulsan lacked legal standing to challenge the process because submitting a bid did not create enforceable rights over the mine assets.

‘The highest of any offer shall not necessarily be accepted,’ the court noted citing conditions signed by all bidders.

Lesetedi criticised the High Court for failing to properly weigh the interests of creditors and former employees.

He said the lower court ignored the realities facing unpaid workers and the deteriorating financial position of the mine while entertaining litigation from a dissatisfied bidder.

‘No one can say how long the review application will take,’ Justice Lesetedi said. He added that’In the meantime without funds the Liquidator would carry out his responsibilities.’

The Court of Appeal set aside the interim interdict granted by the High Court and dismissed Ulsan’s application with costs.