A European Commission report on Turkey highlights Turkey’s refusal to cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus and its insistence on a two-state solution, whilst the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, at the same time notes the importance the European Union attaches to the resumption and progress of talks aimed at resolving the Cyprus issue. It is important for Turkey to reaffirm its commitment to the talks, Brussels notes, and calls for the avoidance of unilateral actions that increase tensions and hinder the resumption of talks.
The European Commission’s 2026 Report on Turkey, published today, Wednesday, as part of the enlargement package, states that Turkey ‘continued to refuse to recognise and cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus, including on security-related issues, and to veto its application to join or chair various international organisations’. Furthermore, it notes that Turkey ‘continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to the resolutions of the UN Security Council’.
Presenting the Enlargement Package to MEPs on the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) on Wednesday, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos noted that there is “a deterioration in the rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy. These developments widen the gap between Trkiye’s declared goal of joining the EU and its continued backsliding on the fundamental accession criteria. That is why accession negotiations have been at a standstill since 2018.”
At the same time, she noted that “we see intensified cooperation between the EU and Trkiye in areas of mutual interest, such as regional security, trade, climate action and migration, which brings benefits to both sides,” adding that “the EU has a strategic interest in developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with the country, reflecting today’s new realities in Europe.”
On the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Commissioner warned that tensions “could create difficulties,” stressing: “We expect Trkiye to respect international law, good neighbourly relations and the sovereignty of EU Member States.” She added that “the European Union attaches particular importance to the resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks as a means of further strengthening EU-Trkiye cooperation. We fully support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to resume formal talks.”
In its report, the Commission stresses that, despite repeated calls by the European Council and the Commission, Turkey “has yet to fulfil its obligations” under the Declaration of 21 September 2005 and the Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. It adds that Ankara “also failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and did not remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of Cyprus.”
On the latest developments, the report states that “in July 2026, Trkiye signed with the so-called, internationally non-recognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) a Memorandum of Understanding on the development of an undersea natural gas pipeline without the authorization and consent of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. It also continues to insist on its plans for an electricity interconnector with the so-called, internationally non-recognised, ‘TRNC’ in the areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”
Turkish military exercises in the maritime zones of Cyprus, and flights of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in the flight information region and national airspace of Cyprus, continued. Turkey further upgraded its military drone base in Lefkoniko and its naval base in Bogazi, in areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. It also temporarily increased its military presence, including by deploying F-16 fighter jets and air defence systems, in the context of the Iran war. Harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by Turkey continued to be reported.
It is noted in the report that Turkey again criticised the UN Security Council’s decision to renew the mandate of UNFICYP for one year, until 31 January 2027, “without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot community.” On Varosha, the report says Trkiye “did not reverse its actions to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, thereby further entrenching the fait accompli on the ground,” and that the restrictions imposed in 2022 on UNFICYP within the fenced-off area remain, “violating UNSC resolution 789 (1992).” The Commission calls on Turkey to reverse “immediately” the unilateral actions announced on 20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.
The EU, according to the report, “remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework.” On 13 July 2026, the Commission appointed Executive Vice-President Raffaele Fitto as its Special Representative for Cyprus, who “will support UN-led reunification efforts and facilitate renewed negotiations on Cyprus settlement.”
The report adds that “it is important that Trkiye reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus in line with the relevant UNSC Resolutions, including their external aspects. No unilateral actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the island and prevent the resumption of talks.” The Council extended until 30 November 2026 the framework for restrictive measures over unauthorised drilling, with the annex empty. The report notes that Turkey has not carried out unauthorised drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean since the beginning of 2021.
On the Aegean, the report says that since 2023 bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece “have overall improved,” with no unauthorised drilling activities. It adds, however, that flights over Greek islands have resumed and that violations of Greece’s national airspace and territorial waters “have risen significantly.” By Presidential Decree of 15 August 2026, Turkey declared two marine parks in the northeastern Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, which “extend predominantly beyond Turkish territorial waters into the high seas.” More flights of Turkish military jets over Greek islands, “including inhabited ones,” were reported, including in September 2026. Incidents of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by Turkish fishing vessels show a “noticeable increase” compared with the previous reporting period.
Turkey, the report notes, “continued to systematically issue unauthorised general navigational warnings (NAVTEX) and making demilitarisation claims regarding Eastern Aegean islands assigned to Greece under international treaties, thereby implicitly disputing Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.” It also continues to object to Greece’s establishment of three marine parks entirely within Greek territorial waters and, very recently, to spatial planning frameworks for tourism, renewables, industry and supply chain. The inclusion of the doctrine of “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) in Turkish school textbooks is, according to the report, “a cause of concern and risks affecting the ongoing dialogue and regional cooperation.” It states that the 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, on a casus belli in case of unilateral extension of Greek territorial waters, still holds. Trkiye is expected to make “an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.”
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the report devotes considerable space to Libya. In October 2026, the Benghazi-based House of Representatives ratified the 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, which, according to the Commission, “infringes the sovereign rights of third states, and does not comply with the Law of the Sea.” In a joint statement, the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council reiterated the EU’s position that the agreement is “null and void and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states.”
The report notes that “sustainable de-escalation has yet to be achieved,” as the ratification shows. In February 2026, Libya’s National Oil Corporation granted an exploration license to Turkey’s state-owned TPAO. The report also says the EU’s efforts to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya “continued to be challenged by Trkiye’s scepticism towards Operation EUNAVFOR MED Irini.” On the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU Project of Common Interest, Trkiye “continued to impede survey activities,” while the observer status of Turkish grid operator TEIAS at ENTSO-E was not renewed in June 2026.
On foreign and security policy, the Commission notes that Turkey “remained open to substantive exchanges with the EU,” but “made no effort to improve its alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), despite its stated strategic goal of joining the EU.” Its alignment rate with statements by the High Representative and Council decisions on sanctions was “very low,” at 4% as of 1 September 2026, up from 3% in 2025.
Turkey did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia but “partially cooperated” to prevent their circumvention through its territory. Exports of EU-origin Common High Priority List items to Russia fell by 86% in 2025 compared with 2023, but remain higher than pre-war volumes. Turkey has also “emerged as a major trading hub for oil products, providing substantial revenues to Russia,” while the Commission calls for urgent further efforts to prevent circumvention and to address risks linked to Russia’s “Shadow Fleet.” A European official who briefed the press said that “the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia remains important. Trkiye has made some progress, but should make more progress.”
The report also states that Turkey “continued to seek involvement in CSDP and EU defence initiatives” while “simultaneously maintaining its policy of excluding one EU Member State from cooperation with NATO.” It adds that Trkiye’s “narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation framework continued to pose an obstacle” to enhancing key aspects of a genuine and sustainable relationship between the two organisations. The same chapter records the signing, on 7 August 2026, of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Trkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It also records the US President’s announcement, on the margins of the NATO Summit in Ankara in July, of the lifting of CAATSA sanctions and readiness to consider F-35 sales to Trkiye, linked to a possible sale of the Russian S-400 system to a third country.
On the Middle East, Turkey aligned with the EU’s position on the need for a diplomatic solution to the war in Iran and for restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and takes part in the Global Coalition for the implementation of the two-state solution. Its position on Hamas, which Ankara considers a “legitimate political interlocutor,” “cannot be reconciled” with the EU’s, which lists Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Relations with Israel “continued to deteriorate,” with Turkey having issued arrest warrants for dozens of Israeli officials, including the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. The normalisation process with Armenia “progressed” during the reporting period.
On the domestic front, the report speaks of “a serious cause for concern” regarding the functioning of democratic institutions, with continuing “democratic backsliding.” It refers to the continued detention of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, whose trial began on 9 March 2026 and whose indictment carries a sentence of up to 2,430 years in prison. It also refers to the annulment by an appellate court, in May 2026, of the CHP’s congresses, and to the suspension or arrest of 22 CHP mayors since 1 September 2025, bringing the total to 49 since the last local elections.
Turkey remains at “an early stage of preparation” in the area of the rule of law and fundamental rights, and “backsliding continued.” The report says the reporting period provided “further evidence of the control exercised by the executive over the judiciary.” The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR described the continued detention of Osman Kavala as a “flagrant denial of justice.” On press freedom, the report says that in October 2026 the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) seized Halk TV, appointed trustees and took the channel off the air. It adds that 74 journalists and media workers were arrested, imprisoned or remained in pre-trial detention between September 2025 and September 2026, compared with 51 in the same period of 2024-2025.
On migration, the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement “has continued to yield results and has remained the key framework for cooperation on migration,” according to the Commission. Turkey hosts 2.3 million refugees and the EU has mobilised EUR 12.5 billion since 2011. The Commission asks Turkey to fully implement the March 2016 Statement, resume returns from the Greek islands and implement all provisions of the Readmission Agreement in relation to all Member States. On visas, Turkey “continues to apply a discriminatory visa policy against nationals of Cyprus” and made no progress on the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation roadmap.
On the economy, Turkey was the EU’s fifth largest trading partner in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching “a record high of over EUR 218 billion.” The Commission assesses the country as “well advanced in establishing a functioning market economy,” having made “some progress.” Inflation remains high, at around 31% year-on-year since the end of 2025, and the central bank’s independence is not yet entrenched.