I too, was about to succumb to the disease of forgetting. Fortunately, someone challenged a claim in a Facebook repost criticising the Government’s sluggish response to the Ditwah displaced. So, I looked for official data to see if things have changed since 3 March 2026 when I wrote about housing for the Ditwah displaced.
The first thing I noticed was that the Government had ceased to publish Ditwah-related situation reports after 17 April. Even the international Government organisations had switched off after April. The most recent situation report from OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the UN) is dated 1 May 2026.
Individuals can succumb to the disease of forgetting. It is said that people in Sri Lanka forget after two weeks. But can a Government? Can the Disaster Management Centre, whose raison d’etre is ensuring recovery from disasters, forget? Or is it not forgetting, but the active suppression of data that may be used to hold the Government to account?
Lack of progress on housing
When I last wrote on this subject in early March, the official reports said that 1,151 families were in camps. According to the last Ditwah Situation Report, 494 families were still in camps. This possibly includes those still living in tents in Wavendon Estate, Ramboda and Welimada, as I am reliably informed.
The largest number of displaced families are staying with family and friends. In February, 45,034 families were dependent on the kindness of family and friends. There was a negligible decrease to 44,179 by April.
Building houses is difficult. Finding land to build houses is even more difficult. Other than announcements of 1,000 transitional houses that were to be built by the armed forces, little progress appears to have been made with temporary housing to get people out of camps and tents. How does this compare with the period immediately after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004? An Oxfam International report published on 14 December 2005, ‘A Place to Stay, A Place to Live,’ stated that around 95% of people had been moved into transitional shelters. How likely is it that 95% of the 44,000 families (plus those in rented accommodation) can be resettled by December 2026?
Building houses is difficult. Finding land to build houses is even more difficult. Other than announcements of 1,000 transitional houses that were to be built by the armed forces, little progress appears to have been made with temporary housing to get people out of camps and tents. How does this compare with the period immediately after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004?
An Oxfam International report published on 14 December 2005, ‘A Place to Stay, A Place to Live,’ stated that around 95% of people had been moved into transitional shelters. How likely is it that 95% of the 44,000 families (plus those in rented accommodation) can be resettled by December 2026?
Three things to do
The gargantuan 25-person task force appointed by the President has proved that it is not up to the task. A task force where every member has other pressing duties cannot move at speed. The housing subcommittee has been ineffective. A task force can break log jams and be useful. But there must be a single driven individual/agency whose only performance indicator is how many families are back in their own homes, permanent or transitional.
Within weeks of the 2004 Tsunami, the Government had set up TAFREN [Task Force to Rebuild the Nation], headed by the late Mano Tittawella, a doer with direct access to the President. Its CEO was Rohini Nanayakkara who had served as General Manager of the Bank of Ceylon and helped establish Seylan Bank. They recruited individuals from the private sector with the right attitudes and skills. They did not build houses but made sure they got built. Though called a task force, this was actually an agency staffed by full-time employees.+
The first recommendation as we enter the 10th month after Ditwah is to establish a TAFREN-like agency, with clearly defined performance indicators. Keep the Task Force/Committee but use it to facilitate the work of the agency. Parliament has sole authority over public finance. Given the reports of underspending of the Rs. 500 billion supplementary allocation for Ditwah recovery in December 2025, and the reports of non-spending of the Ditwah-recovery funds contributed to Treasury, Parliament must make these two items a priority
The first recommendation as we enter the 10th month after Ditwah is to establish a TAFREN-like agency, with clearly defined performance indicators. Keep the Task Force/Committee but use it to facilitate the work of the agency.
Parliament has sole authority over public finance. Given the reports of underspending of the Rs. 500 billion supplementary allocation for Ditwah recovery in December 2025, and the reports of non-spending of the Ditwah-recovery funds contributed to Treasury, Parliament must make these two items a priority. The Committee on Public Finance has been commendably persistent on the fund that was to have received the private-sector contributions. COPF is the logical actor here, but a Select Committee may allow a singular focus.
The second recommendation is for Parliament to exercise oversight on Ditwah spending, not leaving it to an Additional Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.
The second recommendation is for Parliament to exercise oversight on Ditwah spending, not leaving it to an Additional Secretary of the Ministry of Defence
The supplementary estimate approved in December allocated Rs. 100 billion for housing reconstruction. More will be needed. Some of the houses will need access roads. All will need water, sewerage and electricity connections.
All this requires imported material. Starting from clinker to cement to roofing sheets, most construction material is imported. The effective tariff rate on tiles amounts to 100.63% plus SSCL. On aluminum, it’s 81% plus. Costs double when construction material clears the port.
With these exorbitant prices, our young people are unable to realise the dream of owning a home; tourist hotels are hamstrung in competition with neighbouring countries. And now, the Ditwah displaced will get less house for the money.
The gazette to phase out para tariffs such the Port and Airport Levy (PAL) and CESS was published. The phase out is cowardly, kicking most of the cuts to after the Presidential election. The urgent need is to zero out the punitive para tariffs applied to construction material. No gradual phasing out; cut to zero.
Those who have been gorging at the para-tariff trough will protest. Treasury officials will raise concerns about the negative impact on revenue targets. But the numbers are clear, the other sources of Government revenues are over-performing. The Government can do without the revenue from SSCL, PAL and CESS.
All this requires imported material. Starting from clinker to cement to roofing sheets, most construction material is imported. The effective tariff rate on tiles amounts to 100.63% plus SSCL. On aluminium, it’s 81% plus. Costs double when construction material clears the port. With these exorbitant prices, our young people are unable to realise the dream of owning a home.And now, the Ditwah displaced will get less house for the money. The gazette to phase out para tariffs such the Port and Airport Levy (PAL) and CESS was published. The phase out is cowardly, kicking most of the cuts to after the Presidential election. The urgent need is to zero out the punitive para tariffs applied to construction material. No gradual phasing out; cut to zero
The third recommendation is to zero out the counter-productive para tariffs, at least for the HS codes covering construction material.