Lecture delivered under the joint auspices of the Geographical Society and the Federalist Society of Nigeria at the University of Ibadan on 16th May, 1970
CONTINUED FROM LAST WEEK
I take it that we all agree that the civil war, like any war at all for that matter, could not have been fought for any length of time, let alone victoriously after a protracted campaign, without adequate funds. This being so, I would like to state that financing the Nigerian civil war – that is, making it possible for us to wage the war as we did – has left us with bad and good legacies which can have far-reaching implications for the future economy of the nation. I propose to deal with six of such implications.
FIRST: Because of the protraction and continuous escalation of the war, Nigeria is now left with a large army – about twenty times its pre-war size – which poses a serious dilemma for the economy. If we continue to keep them at the present strength, the bulk of our resources would have to be diverted for their maintenance, to the prejudice of the economy and of the masses of our people. On the other hand, if we demobilised a large number of them immediately, without their simultaneous absorption into alternative employments, our highways and alleyways would, of a certainty, be infested by hungry, discontented, and disillusioned youths who might be tempted to commit violent crimes, again to the prejudice of the economy and of the masses of our people.
SECOND: Today, most of our hospitals as well as many of our homes are filled with the maimed and the wounded of the war. For many years to come, they will, quite properly, remain an unreciprocated charge on the economy. In other words, they will remain an inevitable addition to the country’s population of non-producers who must be fed, housed, clad, and generally cared for at public expense.
THIRD: Extensive damage and destruction to public and private properties had been caused, in certain parts of the country, as a result of the war. All these will have to be made good and restored with new resources which would otherwise have been utilised for new and additional developments.
FOURTH: I did speak before of the crazy vagaries of the unorthodox market for arms and ammunition in which we were obliged to operate in the early stages of the war. This is putting it mildly and politely. In all its aspects, war is very bad business; and the unorthodox ,market for military equipment is the worst and the most sordid black market conceivable. It was abundantly clear to us that, if our proposed Iron and Steel Complex had been in production, we would have been able to produce all the small arms and ammunition needed by us, at the Nigeria Defence Industries. Partly because of the state of mind into which it was thrown by the sharp practices of arms racketeers, the Federal Military Government gave a big fillip to the negotiation for establishing an Iron and Steel Complex for Nigeria; and if all goes well, the Complex should be in production by about 1974 or 1975. All of us know what this means for the future economy of our country, especially if petro-chemical industry is established in the country, simultaneously. In concrete terms, it means self-sufficiency in practically all consumer durables; it means the local production of a good number of capital goods; and it also ipso facto means considerable savings and increase in our foreign exchange reserve.
FIFTH: The exigencies of the war did well to shock us out of our traditional complacencies, and to compel us to make a clean break with the injudicious and injurious economic policies of the past, and chart for ourselves a new path of financial prudence. Practically, all the important measures introduced by us during the war testify to the validity of this assertion. The selective restrictions on imports and the attendant switch to import-substituting goods; the sealing of wasteful loopholes in our foreign exchange transactions and earnings, including the centralisation in the hands of the Central Bank of all foreign exchange receipts emanating from Nigeria; the financing of the Marketing Boards by the Central Bank with consequent automatic advantages to the Government and Marketing Boards alike, in additional revenue for the former and lower rate of interest, coupled with assured source of finance, for the latter, the introduction of companies super tax and payment of terminal dues – all these and more are concrete evidence of what we had done to arrest the unhealthy trends of the past, and are accurate pointers to what can be done in the future to make Nigeria a free, self-reliant, and prosperous economy.
SIXTH: The financing of the civil war has enabled us to discover that Nigeria possesses an economic resilience and expansiveness which we did not sufficiently notice before. In this connection, I would like to emphasise that this resilience, and this expansiveness, was by no means accidental.
All the requisite material and manpower resources for the early attainment of economic greatness have always been available in abundance, and are only waiting to be conscientiously recognised, mobilised, and deployed. Potentially, Nigeria is a giant economy capable, under prudent and competent guidance, of making giant strides. All those who are concerned with making plans for her forward motion must recognise this important fact, lest, as in the past, they hinder her natural velocity. There are classical instances of inadvertent hindrances in the past. The 1962/68 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN assumed a growth rate of 4 per cent. The GUIDEPOSTS FOR SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN which was published in June 1966 assumed a growth rate of 6 per cent for 1968/73.
In paragraph 10 of the GUIDEPOSTS, the following revealing passage occurs: ‘If the 4 per cent minimum growth rate per annum assumed under the current plan is realised, the GDP will amount of about £1,304 million in 1967/68. During the period 1968/69 to 1972/73 it will be assumed that the GDP will more resistant in their operations, than any armed rebellion. They grow at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, bringing it to a level of £ 1,744 million at the end of the next Plan periodare the enemies which must now be crushed, and crushed ruthlessly.
Contrary to the plans and prognostications of experts, there are only two ob~tacles that I can see to the early conquest economy actually grew at an average rate of 6.6 per cent during the of these monstrous enemies, and hence to the rapid economic and period of 1959/67, and the GDP in 1966/67 stood at £ 1,605 million social transformation of Nigeria. They are: lack of sufficient number as contrasted with £1,304 million and £1,744 million forecast for it of Nigerians with the requisite expertise to plan and execute our for 1967/68 and 1972/73 respectively development programme, and lack of sufficient resources to defray.