Nearly six decades after its founding, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) finds itself back where it began — divided, uncertain, and vulnerable to the influence of major powers. Once hailed as a model for regional cooperation in the developing world, Asean now faces a crisis of purpose. Unless it can rediscover the unity and collective way forward that defined its early decades, Southeast Asia’s flagship institution risks slipping into irrelevance.
Asean’s first two decades were marked by pragmatic unity. Born amid Cold War rivalries and regional instability, the grouping managed to strike a delicate balance between national sovereignty and collective purpose. Its guiding principles — non-interference in domestic affairs of fellow member states and consensus-based decision-making — kept peace within the bloc and allowed each other to focus on economic development.
By the 1990s, Asean had transformed itself into a regional leader. It helped launch the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) forum in 1989, created the Asean Free Trade Area (Afta) in 1992, and established the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 to promote dialogue and security cooperation. Even after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Asean pressed on with new initiatives such as Asean Plus Three and, later, the East Asia Summit in 2005 — a bold attempt to include all major Indo-Pacific powers under one diplomatic umbrella.
This was the high point of what became known as “Asean Centrality” — the idea that the region’s strategic balance revolved around Asean-led mechanisms and the grouping’s convening authority. The formation of the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and its expanded ADMM-Plus in 2010 underscored Asean’s role as the convener and consensus-builder of Asia’s security architecture.
But cracks soon appeared. In 2012, under Cambodia’s chairmanship, Asean failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in its history. The cause was the South China Sea dispute — specifically, disagreements over China’s assertive maritime claims. Beijing’s growing power, coupled with economic dependence among some Asean members, splintered the bloc’s unity. That same year, President Xi Jinping rose to power and unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a sweeping global infrastructure and trade strategy that expanded China’s influence across Asia.
For Southeast Asia, the BRI brought roads, ports, and investment — but also debt, dependency, and strategic vulnerability. The external pressures mounted as global events intensified: the US-China rivalry hardened; Myanmar descended into civil war after the 2021 coup; Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict divided member states along political and religious lines. The once-cohesive Asean now finds itself paralysed by internal divisions and external shocks.
No issue illustrates Asean’s weakness more starkly than the crisis in Myanmar. Nearly five years since the coup, the junta — rebranded as the State Security and Peace Commission — has been unable to consolidate its seizure of power. Resistance forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDF), and a range of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), now control large swaths of territory representing more than half of the country.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance — comprising the Kokang, Ta’ang, and Arakan Armies — has become the most effective military coalition. China, meanwhile, maintains deep ties with ethnic forces in Shan and Kachin states while protecting its own interests in ports, pipelines, and cross-border trade routes. For Beijing, Myanmar’s collapse into fragmentation poses a security risk.
Beijing has thus backed the junta’s plan to hold elections in December 2025 and January 2026 in pursuit of a semblance of order under its watch. But for the vast majority of Myanmar citizens, these polls will be a sham. Asean now faces a daunting dilemma of engaging the junta and legitimising it or standing aside and thereby ceding influence entirely to China.
The United States, distracted elsewhere, has dialled back support for Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance. Without sustained backing, the NUG and EAOs outside China’s orbit may lose momentum. If that happens, Myanmar’s fate — and by extension Asean’s credibility — may well be decided in Beijing. Malaysia, as Asean chair this year and the Philippines and Singapore in 2026-27, will need to take the lead in reshaping Asean’s engagement. The Five-Point Consensus has failed. A new approach — one that fosters dialogue, power-sharing, and humanitarian relief — is urgently needed.
As if Myanmar were not enough, Asean in 2025 faced its gravest intra-regional crisis yet, namely a border war between Thailand and Cambodia. In five days of fighting in late July along an 800-kilometre frontier, both sides deployed war-grade weaponry, resulting in at least 43 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and more than 300,000 displaced civilians. Ironically, Asean itself was born in 1967 partly to prevent such intramural conflicts, following Indonesia and Malaysia’s Konfrontasi clash. Yet six decades later, an intra-Asean war has erupted — shaking the bloc’s core foundations.
A fragile ceasefire was achieved only after US intervention. Under the Putrajaya Agreement, both sides agreed to halt hostilities amid threats from US President Donald Trump to suspend tariff talks. Subsequent Asean-brokered negotiations in Kuala Lumpur produced a 13-point truce, but tensions remain high. Worryingly, nationalist sentiments are intensifying on both sides. Unless Asean deploys peacekeepers — not just observers — renewed conflict is a real risk.
Between the fires of Myanmar’s civil war and the Thai-Cambodian confrontation, Asean now faces its most dangerous period since its founding. The addition of Timor-Leste as a new and 11th member will also dilute the group’s cohesion. Beset by internal conflict and external competition, the organisation must act decisively to preserve what remains of its unity and central regional role.
If it cannot, Asean risks becoming a hollow shell — an institution that still holds meetings and issues statements, but no longer shapes outcomes. The immediate challenge is to undertake urgent reform or risk irrelevance. That Asean remains Southeast Asia’s one and only agency on the international stage should behove and prompt member states to close ranks and enact a major internal shake-up.