Independent commissions have long promised to fight corruption in the Philippines. They are born with strong words and public hope, then die quietly when political winds shift. The Independent Commission for Infrastructure now carries that burden. Supporters say we should ‘let it do its job.’ True, but the real test is whether its work ends in convictions, not press conferences.
History paints a bleak picture. Former president Elpidio Quirino formed the Integrity Board in 1950, which could receive complaints only with Malacañang’s blessing and budget. Former president Ramon Magsaysay’s Presidential Complaints and Action Commission in 1953 energized citizens but lacked prosecutors. Former president Carlos P. Garcia’s Presidential Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency in the late 1950s conducted audits, not graft prosecutions. Former president Diosdado Macapagal’s Presidential Anti-Graft Committee in 1962 vanished with the next administration. Even Congress’ Office of the Citizens’ Counselor under Republic Act No. 6028 in 1969 – an ombudsman-type office – was never implemented. Different names, same fate: short-lived, dependent, disposable.
Only institutions built into the Constitution endured. In 1986, former president Corazon Aquino and the framers of the 1987 Constitution gave the ombudsman fiscal autonomy and its own Office of the Special Prosecutor. That is why major graft cases that reached judgment passed through the ombudsman and the courts, not ad hoc commissions. The lesson is blunt: presidential executive orders stir attention, but courts deliver accountability.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. created the Independent Commission for Infrastructure through Executive Order No. 94. Its mandate covers substandard and ghost infrastructure projects of the last decade. It can subpoena records, hold hearings and submit reports to the President. On paper, the powers look broad. In practice, the design is fragile. Funding still comes from Malacañang. Subpoenas duces tecum need resort to courts for enforcement and contempt citations. Criminal cases still pass through the ombudsman or the Department of Justice (DOJ) before trial. The Sandiganbayan remains the court of jurisdiction. Unless the Commission is welded into this pipeline, it risks becoming another intake layer, not a producer of convictions and eventual imprisonments.
Telling the public to ‘let the commission do its job’ should mean more than patience. It should mean removing obstacles that doomed past bodies. Witnesses must be compelled, not invited. Records must be produced, not requested. Investigations must result in cases filed, not reports shelved. Anything less, and history repeats itself.
Neutrality is critical. The Supreme Court in 2010 struck down former president Benigno Aquino III’s Philippine Truth Commission for targeting a single administration. That ruling was a warning: selective scope kills credibility and invites failure of prosecution. The new Commission cannot afford to look partisan. Its reach must cover all administrations and contractors, with conflict-of-interest rules and independent audits of its members.
If the Commission wants to succeed, it needs fixes now. A memorandum of understanding with the ombudsman and the DOJ would force integration: joint teams, shared evidence rooms and strict deadlines and timelines from referral to filing. A statutory upgrade would secure subpoena power, budget and tenure. Dashboards showing how many cases were referred, information filed and convictions won would keep it accountable. Without these, it risks becoming another short-lived Malacañang creation.
Investigators must also watch where corruption starts: the bidding table. Republic Act 12009, the New Government Procurement Act of 2024, requires disclosure of beneficial ownership, standard bidding forms and budget alignment. Yet it has become common practice to subvert these rules through loopholes or selective enforcement. The Ninoy Aquino International Airport concession is a cautionary tale of a different but related kind. Several petitions before the Supreme Court question how the deal secured rushed approvals, ignored statutory guardrails and approved steep fee hikes despite subverting extant laws. The challenge is how to stop this cycle before it undermines every new reform.
The verdict from history is harsh. Executive-created bodies have been loud but brittle. They were easy to set up, easier to ignore and easiest to dismantle. Unless the new Commission is legally insulated, hardwired into the ombudsman and the DOJ and judged by the convictions and incarcerations it secures, it will follow the same curve.
The Filipino people now cry for convictions and imprisonments of those found guilty of plunder (under Republic Act 7080) and forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties and taxpayers’ monies (under Republic Act 1379), among other relevant laws, after expeditious and public trials by special courts assigned by the Supreme Court to try those indicted. They do not need another body that fades with the headlines. They need concrete results that stand in court. That is the real job the Commission must do.