Public accountability does not end when a public officer leaves office. Whether through retirement, resignation, transfer, or the conclusion of a term, departure from public service does not erase the responsibility to explain decisions made while exercising public authority. Botswana’s constitutional and statutory framework recognises this principle through mechanisms designed to ensure that Parliament can properly perform its oversight role.
The legal foundation for this power lies primarily in the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, rather than in the Standing Orders of Parliament. Standing Orders regulate the internal procedures of the National Assembly and do not, by themselves, create obligations for persons outside it. The Act, by contrast, gives Parliament legally enforceable powers, including the ability to require attendance, compel evidence, and address non-compliance.
Section 9 of the Act permits an order requiring a person to attend before the Assembly or a committee, and its wording is directed at ‘any person’, without limitation to serving public officers. This includes former office-holders where their evidence is relevant to an inquiry. Section 10 requires such an order to be formalised through a summons served on the person concerned, ensuring clear notice of the obligation to attend. If the person fails to comply, section 11 empowers the Speaker to direct the issue of a warrant of apprehension, executable by the Botswana Police Service to secure attendance.
These provisions are not punitive in purpose; they exist to protect Parliament’s constitutional responsibility to oversee public administration and the use of public resources. Section 12 allows witnesses to be examined under oath, while section 19 creates offences relating to failure to attend, refusal to answer lawful questions, and the giving of false evidence.
The Act also recognises reasonable limits. Section 13 permits a witness to object to a question concerning private matters unrelated to the inquiry, though the Speaker, not the witness, determines whether the objection is valid, preventing the protection from becoming an automatic refusal mechanism. Section 14 similarly protects sensitive government or security-related information, but through constitutional and executive process rather than by the witness simply declining to answer. Section 14(4) further limits the use of answers given before Parliament in unrelated civil or criminal proceedings, except in cases of perjury or obstruction arising from that evidence.
The question of former officials becomes especially relevant to parliamentary oversight of public finances. The Public Accounts Committee examines accounts and reports certified by the Auditor-General under the Public Finance Management Act, and such examinations typically occur after the relevant financial period has ended, by which time the responsible official may no longer hold the position. Were accountability to end the moment an official left office, oversight would be significantly weakened, since officials could avoid scrutiny simply by departing before inquiries commence.
The Constitution supports this approach. Section 41 protects a sitting President from certain legal proceedings during the period of office, but that protection is tied to the office and the period of incumbency. Once the office is vacated, the constitutional position changes; a former office-holder retains no general exemption from lawful process merely by virtue of having previously held high public office.
This approach is consistent with parliamentary practice in jurisdictions sharing Botswana’s Westminster legal heritage, where the authority of legislatures to call for persons, papers, and records has long been understood to extend beyond current office-holders, where the information sought concerns matters of public importance and decisions taken during a person’s tenure.
The broader principle is therefore straightforward: public office is a position of responsibility, not a shield from accountability after departure. Parliament’s ability to call former officials before it depends not on whether they remain in office, but on whether their evidence is relevant to its oversight function. A separate constitutional question remains as to how far comparable powers may apply to certain serving constitutional office-holders, including the President, and that issue requires its own analysis. The narrower position, however, is settled: under Botswana’s existing statutory framework, Parliament has both the authority and the mechanisms to require former public officials to account for decisions taken while entrusted with public responsibility.