Sondhi Limthongkul has returned to the political stage, but his latest mobilisation has yet to generate the mass response associated with his earlier campaigns.
The former leader of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has joined Panthep Puaphongphan, chairman of the Yam Fao Phaendin Foundation; activist and lawyer Nitithorn Lamluea; and Pichit Chaimongkol, leader of the Network of Students and People for Reform of Thailand, under the campaign “Take Back Our Thailand”.
The campaign began outside the Israeli embassy on Sept 10, where they raised concerns over foreign nominee businesses and land holdings before moving to the Election Commission (EC) on Sept 25.
At the EC, the grievance shifted to institutional accountability. The group questioned the majority decision not to refer politicians serving on the Bhumjaithai Party executive committee for prosecution in the Senate election-rigging case and demanded the disclosure of individual commissioners’ opinions.
The issue carries particular weight because Bhumjaithai leads the coalition government under Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul.
But Sondhi’s group has framed the dispute primarily as a question of whether the EC is exercising its constitutional powers independently, transparently and in accordance with the rule of law.
That gives the campaign a clear target. The harder task is turning that institutional grievance into a broad public cause.
Sathitorn Thananithichot, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn University, believes the EC remains the movement’s main pressure point.
He sees a possible next step in intensifying scrutiny of the commission and pursuing legal or constitutional avenues that could eventually affect the government or lead to a fresh election.
But he considers that route difficult. The EC has already acted in the Senate case, leaving those who disagree with its decision to pursue complaints and legal challenges rather than relying solely on street mobilisation.
The political system still provides avenues for contestation through the National Anti-Corruption Commission, courts and Parliament.
Unlike in the 2006 and 2014 protests, the institutions under challenge have not become paralysed or produced the kind of political deadlock that helped create conditions for military intervention.
Sondhi’s political history helps explain why his return immediately invites comparisons with 2006 and 2014. PAD-led protests in 2006 became a major confrontation with the Thaksin Shinawatra government before the military coup that year.
In 2014, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) led months of large street protests against the Yingluck Shinawatra government, with the prolonged political crisis ending in another military coup.
Those earlier protest movements developed amid deep political polarisation, sustained street mobilisation and growing institutional deadlock. Mr Sathitorn points to the scale of the Yellow-shirt and PDRC movements as the level of street pressure capable of fundamentally changing the political equation.
That scale is absent today. The Senate case, the EC’s performance and concerns over foreign nominee businesses may resonate with particular groups, but Mr Sathitorn believes they have not created a sufficiently powerful shared grievance to bring large numbers of people onto the streets.
For him, the problem is not simply who leads the movement. Sondhi has a recognisable history in Thailand’s street politics, but leadership cannot substitute for an issue that generates widespread public identification.
The government’s handling of contentious issues has also reduced opportunities for opponents to turn individual decisions into a broader political confrontation.
Mr Sathitorn points to signs the Bhumjaithai-led administration has taken a more measured approach to foreign nominee businesses and concerns over concealed foreign ownership.
Issues involving Israel and China may resonate with particular constituencies, but the government has responded rather than leaving them entirely unanswered.
Another crucial difference from the political environment preceding the coups of 2006 and 2014 is the absence of a visible rupture between the government and the military, he said. The government continues to support the military’s work, and no confrontation between the two sides has emerged as a defining political fault line.
That does not make military intervention impossible under every conceivable circumstance. But for the current movement to alter that equation, protests would first have to expand dramatically and develop into a crisis that existing political mechanisms could no longer contain.
Sondhi’s more immediate role is one of political pressure rather than removing the government. Petitions, demands for documents, scrutiny of independent organisations and public campaigning can keep contentious issues in the political conversation without requiring a mass occupation of the streets.
Whether the campaign’s support base can be expanded is separate from whether it can trigger a political crisis. The first requires sustained public engagement; the second would require a far more dramatic change in the political environment.
So, “Take Back Our Thailand” is best understood as an attempt to build political pressure and scrutinise institutions rather than as the beginning of another large-scale protest movement like those of 2006 and 2014. Its trajectory will depend on whether its grievances can attract support well beyond its current base.