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More than N60 million will be at stake when 100 artists converge on Enugu for the grand finale of the 19th edition of Life in My City Art Festival (LIMCAF). This year’s edition, themed ‘Open Letter’, concludes in the final week of October at the International Conference Centre of the Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu.

Six art professionals have been appointed to the 2026 National Jury Panel. They include: Chike Obeagu as chairman, Adiwu Talatu Onkala, Ugochukwu-Smooth C. Nzewi, Bella Anne C. Ndubuisi, Dotun Popoola and Frank Omoh Agbiyoa Ugiomoh, while Jerry Buhari, a professor, will curate the exhibition.

Their task is to sift through the works that have survived the selection process in LIMCAF’s regional centres. The 100 artists who emerged from the different parts of the country now face the final selection.

Chike Obeagu, who chairs the panel, is a contemporary artist, scholar, curator and an associate professor at the Federal University of Lafia. He has curated LIMCAF three times.

Adiwu Talatu Onkala, an artist and associate professor of Painting at the University of Maiduguri, has engaged with gender, identity and the social realities of contemporary Nigeria, particularly the experiences of women in the Northeast.

Ugochukwu-Smooth C. Nzewi, an artist and art historian, is the Steven and Lisa Tananbaum Curator at New York’s Museum of Modern Art. He previously held curatorial positions at the Cleveland Museum of Art and Dartmouth’s Hood Museum.

Bella Anne C. Ndubuisi, a cultural affairs specialist, has worked in culture, community development and international development. She has also been involved with LIMCAF in Taraba.

Dotun Popoola is a contemporary sculptor known for making works from discarded scrap metal.

Frank Omoh Agbiyoa Ugiomoh, an artist, art historian, critic and educator, has more than four decades of experience. African art history and historiography are central to his scholarship.

Buhari, the exhibition’s curator, has been a professor of Fine Art at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, since 1982. His career has included studio practice, teaching and curating exhibitions in Nigeria and abroad.

The prize money is only part of what the festival has built up since Robert Orji, founder of Rocana Nigeria Limited, started the competition for young artists in 2007. Over the years, LIMCAF has spread its selection process across different parts of the country, while some of its past winners have gone on to establish themselves on the Nigerian visual arts scene.

At the top of the pile is the Elder Kalu Young Artist of the Year Prize, formerly the festival’s overall winner’s prize. It was rechristened last year and is now worth the naira equivalent of $2,000. The prize is sponsored by the family of the late Elder Kalu Uke Kalu, a former LIMCAF chairman and visual arts aficionado.

The category prizes cover photography, painting, sculpture, drawing, ceramics and digital art, ranging from ?500,000 to ?1 million. The Chinelo Chime Prize for Best in Photography carries ?1 million, while the prizes for painting, sculpture, drawing and ceramics are worth ?500,000 each.

There are also prizes with more specific briefs. The Armstrong Agoreyo Prize is for the best artwork made from waste paper, while the Kanyeyachukwu Tagbo Prize recognises an outstanding work by an artist living with a disability.

Individuals, families and organisations have established other prizes. They include the Justice Anthony Aniagolu Prize for Originality and the Dr Pius Okigbo Prize for Technical Proficiency. Regional prizes include the Mfon Usoro Prize for Best Entry from the Uyo Centre and the VinMartins Ilo Prize for Best Entry from Enugu.

The festival’s rewards do not stop at the prize money. One of them is a two-week, all-expenses-paid trip to Dakar, Senegal, for the Dakar Art Biennale, or Dak’Art. There are also residencies and boot camps.

There are special prize categories for female artists, while LIMCAF’s workshops take its activities to primary and secondary school children, with particular attention to those living with disabilities. Abuja and Enugu have hosted some of these workshops in recent years.

Behind the prizes and programmes is a list of supporters that has grown over the years. They include the Alliance Française network in Nigeria, the Institut Français and the French Embassy, as well as Clam Lab, Paris; Rocana Nigeria Limited; the Pan African Circle of Artists; Honeywell Group; FBN Holdings; the Enugu State Council for Art and Culture; the Centre for Contemporary Art, Lagos; and Thought Pyramid Art Centre, Abuja.

The prizes themselves have attracted endowments and special donations from the Justice Anthony Aniagolu family, Vin Martin Ilo, Thought Pyramid Art Centre, Mfon Usoro, the Pius Okigbo family, Art Is Everywhere, the Centre for Contemporary Art, Professor El Anatsui and Engr. Gesi Asamaowei, among others.

Robert Orji started LIMCAF in 2007 as a competition for young artists. Since then, artists from different parts of the country have entered each year, while several past overall and category prize winners have gone on to establish themselves on the Nigerian visual arts scene.

This year’s finalists will meet in Enugu in October, as LIMCAF looks forward to its 20th edition next year.

Former presidential aide, Okoi Obono-Obla, has hit back at Senate President, Godswill Akpabio, over comments on Cross River State, accusing him of misrepresenting the state’s geographical position and making an unsubstantiated claim about its population.

Obono-Obla, in a statement issued in Abuja on Friday, rejected assertions attributed to Akpabio that Cross River is landlocked, that the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary lies in Akwa Ibom State and that 40 percent of Cross River’s population are people of Akwa Ibom origin.

He argued that the controversy over Cross River’s littoral status should not be confused with the state’s geographical relationship with the sea.

Roots of the dispute

The dispute has its roots in the International Court of Justice’s October 10, 2002 judgment in the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary case, in which the Court ruled that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lay with Cameroon and ordered Nigeria to withdraw its administration and security forces from territory falling under Cameroonian sovereignty.

Obono-Obla acknowledged that the subsequent legal consequences stripped Cross River of the benefits associated with littoral status, including its claim to 76 offshore oil wells.

The Supreme Court, in the 2012 case between Cross River and the Federal Government and Akwa Ibom, held that Cross River no longer had the seaward boundary necessary to qualify as a littoral state for offshore oil-well attribution.

But Obono-Obla maintained that the legal position does not erase the state’s geographical history.

‘That is a legal fiction, not geographical reality,’ he said, arguing that Bakassi historically formed the southernmost part of Cross River and extended into the Gulf of Guinea.

Land boundary vs maritime boundary

On the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary, Obono-Obla said Akpabio’s reported comments amounted to a conflation of the land boundary with the maritime boundary.

‘The land boundary is in Cross River State,’ he argued, adding that what the courts determined was that the maritime boundary following the loss of Bakassi no longer gave Cross River the littoral status it previously enjoyed.

The ICJ judgment itself distinguishes between the land boundary running to the Bakassi Peninsula and the subsequent maritime delimitation between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Obono-Obla also addressed the appointment of Senator Asuquo Ekpenyong as Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Niger Delta Development Commission, describing the appointment as commendable.

However, he questioned the political significance attached to bringing a Cross River senator to an event while, according to him, simultaneously describing the state as landlocked and non-littoral.

He described that as ‘political tokenism’ and said genuine support for Cross River would involve backing its demands over its maritime status, oil-well interests and the resettlement of displaced Bakassi people.

Population claim challenged

The former presidential aide also took issue with the reported claim that 40 per cent of Cross River’s population are Akwa Ibom people.

He said he was unaware of any empirical basis for the figure from the National Population Commission, National Bureau of Statistics or another credible statistical authority.

Obono-Obla described the assertion as divisive and called for greater sensitivity from political leaders.

The wider Cross River-Akwa Ibom dispute over the 76 offshore oil wells has been litigated for years. In its 2012 judgment, the Supreme Court found that Cross River had ceased to be a littoral state following the implementation of the ICJ judgment and that the disputed offshore wells could not be attributed to the state on that basis.

Obono-Obla, however, is now seeking to reopen the broader political and geographical conversation, insisting that the legal loss of littoral benefits should not be presented as evidence that Cross River is geographically without a coastline.

‘Cross River remains a coastal state in geography, history and in the hearts of its people,’ he said, while acknowledging that the law has, for now, removed the benefits attached to littoral status.

He called for ‘statesmanship and sensitivity’ in the handling of the issue.

The decision by the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to formalize their cooperation through a Memorandum of Understanding on fiscal and monetary policy coordination marks an important development in Nigeria’s economic management. For an economy in which government spending, public borrowing, liquidity conditions, exchange-rate movements, inflation and private-sector credit are deeply interconnected, the institutionalization of regular policy coordination is both timely and economically significant. The MoU provides a framework for cooperation that goes beyond personal relationships between the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the CBN, establishing structured mechanisms for information-sharing, aligned macroeconomic assumptions and the resolution of areas where fiscal and monetary actions might otherwise work at cross-purposes.

The logic behind the initiative is straightforward. Fiscal and monetary policies may be administered by different institutions, but they operate within the same economy and ultimately affect many of the same variables. Government borrowing and expenditure can influence liquidity, aggregate demand, interest rates and inflation, while monetary policy affects the cost and availability of credit, government debt-servicing costs, investment and economic activity. When the two arms of economic policy pull in different directions, one authority can end up attempting to offset the unintended consequences of the other. Conversely, when they operate within a coherent macroeconomic framework, their respective instruments can reinforce rather than undermine one another.

This is particularly important as Nigeria seeks to consolidate the macroeconomic gains of recent reforms while addressing the continuing burden of high prices and expensive credit. The International Monetary Fund, in its 2026 Article IV assessment, noted that reforms since 2023, including tighter monetary policy, the removal of fuel subsidies, deficit-monetization reforms and exchange-rate liberalization, have strengthened macroeconomic stability, rebuilt external buffers and improved foreign-exchange market functioning. At the same time, the Fund noted that conditions remain difficult for many Nigerians and that inflationary pressures remain a concern.

The MoU is therefore significant not simply because it creates another mechanism for meetings between government officials, but because it recognizes an elementary truth of macroeconomic management: price stability cannot sustainably be pursued by monetary policy in isolation from fiscal policy. The agreement provides for more consistent forecasts of inflation, economic growth, government revenue, liquidity, financing requirements and the external sector. It also envisages stronger information-sharing and a coordinated approach to inflation that combines fiscal discipline with measures directed at food, energy and logistics costs.

Such coordination, however, should never be confused with subordination of the CBN to the fiscal authority. The distinction between coordination and interference is fundamental. Central-bank independence does not mean that monetary authorities should operate in an economic vacuum. Rather, it means that, once the objectives and institutional framework of monetary policy have been established, the central bank should retain the freedom to determine the instruments and timing required to achieve those objectives without undue political pressure.

Nigeria’s own legal framework recognizes this principle. Section 1(3) of the CBN Act 2007 provides that the Bank shall be an independent body in the discharge of its functions, while Section 30 gives the Bank powers over open-market operations and other securities for liquidity management. The challenge, therefore, is not to choose between coordination and independence, but to design institutions in which both can coexist: coordinated objectives and information-sharing on one hand, and operational and instrument independence on the other.

Indeed, international experience demonstrates that central bank independence does not necessarily require a central bank to possess complete goal independence. In several advanced and emerging economies, governments or legislatures establish the broad monetary-policy objectives or inflation targets, while central banks retain substantial independence over how those objectives are achieved.

The United Kingdom provides a particularly instructive example. The Government sets the Bank of England’s 2 percent inflation target, while the Monetary Policy Committee determines the monetary-policy instruments used to achieve it. The Bank’s current framework also requires the MPC to support the Government’s economic policy, including growth and employment, subject to maintaining price stability. The important institutional distinction is that the government defines the destination while the central bank retains considerable discretion over the route.

The United States offers another example. The Federal Reserve does not possess unrestricted goal independence: Congress has established maximum employment and stable prices as key statutory objectives of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve nevertheless exercises considerable independence in determining how to pursue those objectives. Its current framework continues to define monetary policy around the statutory goals of maximum employment and stable prices.

New Zealand similarly provides for government determination of the broader monetary-policy framework. The Reserve Bank currently operates with a government-set inflation objective of maintaining inflation between 1 and 3 percent over the medium term, with a focus on the 2 percent midpoint, while its Monetary Policy Committee independently makes monetary-policy decisions. South Africa also offers a useful illustration. The South African Reserve Bank states that its inflation target is set by government in consultation with the Bank, while the Bank independently determines monetary policy and the policy rate needed to achieve that target.

These examples suggest that there is nothing inherently inconsistent between joint determination of broad macroeconomic objectives and central-bank independence in the use of policy instruments. Indeed, as Nigeria advances towards a more explicit inflation-targeting framework, the question of who should establish the target deserves careful institutional consideration. A credible arrangement could involve the fiscal and monetary authorities jointly determining an inflation objective within a transparent legal framework, while leaving the CBN free to determine the policy rate, liquidity operations, reserve instruments and other monetary tools necessary to pursue that objective.

Such an arrangement would also strengthen democratic accountability. Inflation is not merely a monetary statistic; it has profound consequences for household welfare, business planning, wages, investment and public finances. If an inflation target is ultimately a national economic objective, there is a legitimate argument for ensuring that its determination reflects the broader economic policy framework rather than being treated exclusively as the preserve of the monetary authority. The critical safeguard would be to ensure that the process is transparent, rules-based and insulated from short-term political pressures.

The argument for stronger coordination is reinforced by the experience of recent Nigerian monetary policy. The CBN has pursued a significantly tighter monetary stance as part of the effort to bring inflation under control and stabilize the macroeconomic environment. The IMF has specifically welcomed progress towards inflation targeting and noted that monetary tightening, together with broader reforms, has contributed to improved macroeconomic stability.

These developments deserve recognition. Exchange-rate stability, improved foreign-exchange market functioning, stronger external buffers and greater liquidity in the foreign-exchange market are important foundations for restoring confidence in the Nigerian economy. The CBN itself has identified operational independence, clearer inflation targeting and stronger communication as important components of its evolving monetary-policy framework.

But monetary tightening cannot be an end in itself. Once tight monetary policy has served its stabilization purpose, attention must increasingly turn to the cost and availability of credit. Persistently high borrowing costs can restrain private investment, working capital, housing finance and business expansion. An economy cannot achieve durable growth simply by suppressing demand; it must also create conditions under which productive investment can obtain financing at sustainable costs.

This is where fiscal-monetary coordination becomes particularly important. If fiscal operations generate avoidable liquidity pressures or excessive government demand for domestic financing, monetary policy may be forced to remain tighter for longer than would otherwise be necessary. The result can be higher borrowing costs for businesses and households and weaker private-sector credit. The MoU’s emphasis on coordinating government financing and cash management to reduce the risk of crowding out private-sector credit is therefore economically consequential.

There is another institutional issue that deserves attention: the importance of genuine debate within the CBN’s Monetary Policy Committee. An independent committee is most valuable when its members are able to bring different analyses, assumptions and assessments of economic conditions to the policy table. Repeatedly unanimous decisions are not, by themselves, evidence of a problem; consensus may sometimes genuinely reflect the evidence available to policymakers. But if unanimity becomes so persistent that independent members rarely disclose meaningful differences in their assessment of risks, the public value of a committee structure can be diminished. Diversity of views can improve scrutiny, reveal uncertainty and strengthen the quality of monetary-policy deliberations.

The next logical step, therefore, should be to move fiscal and monetary coordination from administrative practice towards a durable institutional framework. The present MoU can provide a useful foundation, but an arrangement of such economic importance should ultimately rest on clear statutory provisions. Nigeria could consider reviewing and, where appropriate, amending the relevant provisions of the CBN Act 2007 and other fiscal-governance legislation to establish a transparent framework for fiscal-monetary coordination, clarify the respective responsibilities of the fiscal and monetary authorities, establish procedures for setting broad inflation objectives, and protect the CBN’s instrument and operational autonomy.

Such legislation should not create a mechanism through which fiscal authorities can dictate monetary-policy decisions. Rather, it should codify the distinction between shared macroeconomic objectives and independent policy instruments. The fiscal authority should remain responsible for fiscal policy, taxation, public expenditure and debt management, while the CBN should retain the authority necessary to conduct monetary policy. At the same time, both institutions should be required to exchange information, publish relevant assumptions and explain publicly how their policies interact. The broader objective should be a coherent economic policy architecture in which monetary, fiscal, trade, financial and structural policies reinforce one another.

Indeed, Nigeria’s current circumstances make this institutional question especially urgent. The country has made measurable progress in rebuilding macroeconomic stability, but inflation, financing costs, food and transport pressures, weak monetary transmission and the need for stronger private-sector credit continue to present difficult policy challenges. The CBN’s own 2026 outlook anticipates further disinflation and a lower interest-rate environment while recognizing the importance of monetary conditions, fiscal operations and financial-market stability.

The newly signed MoU should consequently be viewed as the beginning of a more mature phase of economic management rather than the conclusion of one. Its success will depend not merely on the number of meetings held but on whether the two institutions actually develop common macroeconomic assumptions, coordinate fiscal and liquidity management, communicate consistently with markets and the public, and avoid policies that unnecessarily neutralize one another.

All said, the ultimate test of the arrangement will be whether it helps Nigeria achieve what monetary and fiscal policy are supposed to achieve together: a stable price environment, sustainable public finances, functioning financial markets, improved access to productive credit and conditions conducive to sustainable economic growth. Coordination can make those objectives more attainable, but coordination must be designed around clear institutional boundaries. The CBN must be able to determine how monetary objectives are achieved, while the fiscal authorities must take responsibility for the fiscal choices within their mandate. Properly institutionalized, that balance would not weaken central-bank independence; it would give independence a more coherent economic framework within which it can operate effectively.

As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 general elections, the leadership of the Nigeria Police Force, government officials, and security experts have outlined measures aimed at strengthening election security, police professionalism, and public confidence in the democratic process.

The discussions formed the centrepiece of the sixth Conference and Retreat for Senior Police Officers (CARSPO 2026), held in Owerri, Imo State, under the theme ‘Developing a Nigeria Police Roadmap for Effective Management of Security During Elections.’

The three-day conference, which opened on September 21, brought senior police officers and other stakeholders together to examine emerging security threats and develop operational strategies ahead of the 2027 polls.

At the conclusion of the retreat, Inspector-General of Police Olatunji Disu unveiled a six-pillar election-security framework anchored on intelligence, training, inter-agency coordination, technology, community partnership, and neutrality.

Disu directed senior officers to translate the resolutions of the conference into practical measures across commands and formations, stressing that the effectiveness of CARSPO would be measured by improvements in policing nationwide.

He ordered participants to adopt a ‘train-the-trainers’ model, cascading lessons from the conference to Deputy Commissioners of Police, Area Commanders, Divisional Police Officers, tactical commanders, and other personnel.

The IGP also urged commands to strengthen operational planning, intelligence gathering, personnel training, and community engagement ahead of the elections.

Disu: Police must remain politically neutral

Disu placed political neutrality at the centre of the Force’s election-security responsibilities, stressing that the police must serve the Constitution, the law, and the Nigerian people rather than any political party, candidate, or interest group.

‘The loyalty of the Nigeria Police Force remains with the Constitution, the law, and the Nigerian people, not with any political party, candidate, or interest group,’ Disu said.

He also commended the quality of presentations at CARSPO, describing the conference as a ‘wonderful initiative.’

The IGP particularly highlighted contributions from retired senior police officers, including former IGP Usman Alkali Baba, whose experience managing the 2023 general elections provided participants with practical insights for addressing electoral security challenges in 2027.

Disu said the lectures were stimulating and educative, but stressed that the knowledge gained must translate into improved operational performance.

Uzodimma calls for voter-focused policing

Imo State Governor Hope Uzodimma, who hosted the conference at the Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu International Convention Centre, said police conduct would have a direct bearing on voter participation and public confidence in the electoral process.

Uzodimma urged the police to prioritise professionalism and combine local knowledge with intelligence-led policing to improve security outcomes.

‘Professionalism must remain a foremost priority to earn public confidence,’ he said. ‘As we approach 2027, the Police must ensure that their actions encourage civic participation rather than intimidate voters.’

The governor called for clearer operational guidelines for security checkpoints and suggested that political candidates undertake sworn commitments against electoral violence.

He also advocated decentralised policing structures, provided safeguards were established to prevent political misuse.

Uzodimma said hosting CARSPO reinforced Imo’s role as a venue for major national engagements on security and institutional development.

Stakeholders seek stronger election institutions

INEC Chairman, Professor Joash Amupitan, identified adequate funding as critical to providing the security and logistics required for the 2027 elections.

He noted that INEC’s responsibilities extend beyond conducting elections to voter registration and registration of political parties, while the Commission has statutory powers to request security deployment during elections and voter registration.

Oyinkansola Badejo-Okusanya, President of the Nigerian Bar Association, urged closer cooperation between the police and INEC, saying effective policing support would be necessary for credible and transparent elections.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, represented by Secretary to the Government of the Federation George Akume at the opening ceremony, reaffirmed the Federal Government’s commitment to supporting the police ahead of the 2027 polls.

He called for professionalism, impartiality, intelligence-led operations and stronger inter-agency coordination, while pledging continued support for police training, technology, operational logistics, welfare and institutional reforms.

Philips: CARSPO delivers security and economic value

For Shina Philips, Managing Director of Lenders Consult International, which coordinated CARSPO 2026, the conference represents both a national security platform and an economic opportunity for its host state.

Philips said the arrival of senior police officers, government officials, security experts, journalists and service providers generated activity across hotels, restaurants, transportation, telecommunications, retail and other businesses.

‘The conference should generate conversations about security, but its impact should extend into the economy. It should strengthen policing, but also strengthen partnerships,’ Philips said.

He said the value of hosting CARSPO should therefore be measured beyond the immediate cost of the conference to include its security, institutional, commercial and reputational benefits.

Imo is hosting CARSPO for the third time, according to Philips, giving the state another opportunity to showcase its capacity to host major national and international gatherings while strengthening relationships among security institutions, government and the private sector.

From conference resolutions to 2027 operations

At the closing ceremony in Owerri, Disu again charged senior officers to ensure that CARSPO’s resolutions do not remain confined to conference rooms.

The six-pillar framework, intelligence, training, inter-agency coordination, technology, community partnership, and neutrality, now provides the broad structure for the Force’s preparations for the 2027 elections.

The challenge, however, will be translating the strategy into consistent field operations across the country’s commands and formations as Nigeria moves closer to the polls.

Economic instability has become an unavoidable reality of doing business in Nigeria, and a few sectors feel their consequences as directly as project development and management.

From residential buildings and commercial centres to roads, industrial facilities, and public infrastructure, projects are conceived on assumptions about cost, financing, time, and market conditions.

Yet, those assumptions can change dramatically between conception and completion. Nigeria has experienced significant shifts in inflation, exchange rates, fuel prices, interest rates and the cost of imported inputs in recent years.

Although recent reforms have contributed to improved macroeconomic stability, inflationary pressures remain significant and external shocks continue to pose risks. The World Bank reported that Nigeria’s economy grew by about 4 per cent in 2025, supported by services, real estate, ICT and construction, while inflation remained elevated.

The IMF has similarly noted that renewed global fuel and food-price pressures can quickly feed into domestic inflation and transport costs. For project stakeholders, therefore, economic volatility is no longer something to be considered only after problems arise; it must be incorporated into project planning from the beginning.

The effect of economic fluctuations on projects is particularly visible in construction. A developer who prepared a bill of quantities, obtained financing and negotiated contracts at one price level may discover that the same project requires substantially more money several months later.

Inflation, exchange-rate movements, and fuel costs can affect cement, steel, electrical components, plumbing materials, finishing products, transportation, and equipment.

The situation becomes more complicated when projects depend on imported materials or equipment, because exchange-rate movements can alter the naira cost even when the international price remains unchanged. Recent Nigerian research has found significant relationships between exchange-rate volatility, imported material costs and budget revisions in construction projects.

This creates a dangerous cycle: rising costs produce budget pressures; budget pressures delay procurement; delays expose projects to another round of price increases; and the resulting cost escalation may threaten the original financial viability of the project. In practical terms, a project that looked profitable at commencement can become financially unattractive before completion.

Time, therefore, has become an economic variable in project management. Traditionally, project managers are expected to control the familiar triangle of cost, time and quality. In an unstable economic environment, however, these variables are increasingly interconnected.

A delay of three or six months is not merely a scheduling problem when interest is accumulating on borrowed funds, contractors are demanding revised prices and construction materials are becoming more expensive.

For property developers in Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt and other rapidly developing urban centres, delayed completion can also mean delayed rental income, delayed sales and additional security, maintenance and professional costs.

Globally, major infrastructure and construction projects face similar challenges from commodity-price movements, supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical tensions and changes in financing conditions.

The lesson is important for Nigeria: project schedules should not be treated as static documents. They should be actively monitored against economic developments, with realistic contingency provisions and clearly defined procedures for dealing with material changes in project conditions.

Financing is another area where economic fluctuations can fundamentally alter project outcomes. Higher interest rates increase the cost of borrowing and can make projects that appeared viable under one financial environment considerably more expensive under another.

Developers who rely heavily on debt financing must therefore examine not only the initial cost of a project but also the sensitivity of its financial returns to changes in interest rates, exchange rates, construction costs, occupancy levels and selling prices.

This is particularly important in Nigeria, where real estate development often involves substantial upfront expenditure and a relatively long period before revenue is realised. A sound feasibility study should consequently contain alternative scenarios rather than a single optimistic projection.

What happens if construction costs rise by 15 per cent? What if the exchange rate moves significantly? What if sales take longer than expected? What if interest rates remain high for another two years? Scenario analysis does not eliminate uncertainty, but it enables stakeholders to understand the consequences before committing substantial capital.

The contractual framework surrounding a project must also reflect economic reality. In periods of relatively stable prices, parties may be comfortable with fixed-price arrangements, but prolonged volatility can expose contractors, consultants and clients to risks that were not properly anticipated at contract signing.

Appropriate price-adjustment or escalation mechanisms, clearly defined variation procedures, realistic completion provisions and transparent risk allocation can help prevent economic shocks from becoming disputes.

This does not mean that every increase in cost should automatically be transferred to the client. Rather, the parties should determine in advance which risks each party is capable of managing and which risks require shared arrangements.

Professional advisers therefore have an increasingly important role to play. Quantity surveyors must provide realistic cost advice; architects and engineers should consider cost-effective specifications; valuers must pay attention to changing market evidence; financiers must stress-test project assumptions; and project managers must coordinate these perspectives into a coherent delivery strategy.

In a volatile economy, multidisciplinary collaboration is no longer a luxury-it is a project-survival mechanism. Technology and better information can further strengthen project resilience. Digital project-management platforms, cost-monitoring systems, Building Information Modelling, procurement databases and data analytics can give stakeholders earlier warning when project performance begins to diverge from the original plan.

Internationally, project organisations are increasingly using data-driven forecasting and scenario modelling to manage uncertainty in complex projects. Nigeria should move in the same direction.

A project manager should know not only how much has already been spent, but also why costs are changing, which procurement items are most vulnerable, how much exposure remains and what alternative actions are available.

For large projects, periodic economic-risk reviews should become part of project governance. Rather than waiting for a budget crisis, stakeholders can monitor inflation, exchange rates, fuel prices, interest rates and supply-chain conditions and incorporate the information into procurement and cash-flow decisions.

The objective is not to predict the future perfectly; it is to make the project sufficiently responsive to changing circumstances.

Ultimately, economic fluctuations do not necessarily make successful project delivery impossible; they make disciplined project management more important. Nigeria’s improving macroeconomic conditions provide opportunities for renewed investment, with the World Bank reporting stronger activity in sectors including real estate and construction, while the IMF has identified continuing external and domestic risks that require vigilance.

The appropriate response from project stakeholders is therefore neither excessive pessimism nor unrealistic optimism, but preparedness.

Developers must strengthen feasibility studies and financial planning; financiers must examine risk realistically; contractors must improve procurement and cost control; consultants must provide timely and evidence-based advice; and project managers must become more proactive in identifying and responding to economic risks.

The Nigerian project environment may remain uncertain, but uncertainty can be managed when stakeholders recognise that economic conditions are part of the project itself. In the years ahead, the projects that preserve cost, time, quality and ultimately value will increasingly be those managed not merely as construction or investment exercises, but as dynamic economic systems capable of adapting to change.