Category: Azer News

The Syrian Arab Army has taken control of the al-Shaddadi military base in Hasakah province, northeastern Syria, following coordination with US officials, the Defense Ministry’s media department announced, AzerNEWS reports.

The handover was completed after formal arrangements were made with US authorities.

This follows a similar development at the al-Tanf military base in southeastern Syria.

On February 12, the Defense Ministry announced that Syrian forces had assumed control of al-Tanf after coordinating with US officials, with army units securing the facility and its surrounding area.

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed the withdrawal of US troops from al-Tanf after nearly ten years of presence, while emphasising that US forces remain ready to respond to any ISIS threats and continue supporting partner-led efforts to prevent the group’s resurgence.

Efforts to reopen the Alican-Margara border crossing between Trkiye and Armenia have accelerated, signaling a potentially significant shift in regional dynamics.

According to reports by Turkish media, Igdir Governor Firat Tasolar has personally inspected the ongoing reconstruction and modernization works at the Alican checkpoint, with technical preparations expected to be completed in the near term.

The momentum around the Alican-Margara crossing also coincides with the construction of the Kars-Igdir-Aralik-Dilucu railway, a project designed to establish a direct land connection between Trkiye and Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan. Stretching 224 kilometres, the line is planned to carry 5.5 million passengers and 15 million tonnes of cargo annually, a capacity that would significantly strengthen regional transport and logistics networks and reinforce long-term connectivity across the South Caucasus.

While no official opening date has been announced, Ankara has repeatedly stated that once technical work is finalized and political conditions align, the process is ready to move forward. But what would reopening this border really mean, for Trkiye-Armenia relations, for regional connectivity, and for the broader South Caucasus?

To explore these questions in greater depth, AzerNEWS spoke with Dr Kerem Karabulut, an economic expert at Atatrk University, who offered a comprehensive and nuanced assessment of the evolving dynamics.

Responding to a question on the potential impact of reopening the Alican-Margara border crossing on Trkiye-Armenia relations, Dr Karabulut began by situating the issue within its broader historical and political context:

‘After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, despite Trkiye’s goodwill efforts, Armenia’s aggressive policies against Azerbaijan-including the occupation of Karabakh, the seizure of roughly twenty percent of Azerbaijani territories, and the Khojaly massacre in which six hundred thirteen women, children, and elderly civilians were killed-led Trkiye to close its borders.’

He stresses that the closure was not only about solidarity with Azerbaijan:

‘Armenia also raised territorial claims against Trkiye, made genocide allegations, and demanded compensation. Because of these factors, Trkiye did not develop relations with Armenia and closed its border crossings.’

Dr Karabulut also touched on Ankara’s potion that has been clear for years, according to him:

‘Trkiye consistently stated that borders could only be opened if Armenia withdrew from Karabakh and abandoned baseless propaganda against Trkiye and Azerbaijan. Before the Karabakh Victory, opening the border was not rational-it would have caused serious political and economic damage to Trkiye and harmed Trkiye-Azerbaijan relations.’

Besides, according to Karabulut, the post-Karabakh Victory environment fundamentally altered this calculation. He argues that the turning point was decisive:

‘After the Karabakh Victory, the situation changed. Even if Armenia was not fully willing, Azerbaijan-through the strength of its army and state strategy-regained its territories. Trkiye strongly supported Azerbaijan throughout this process.’

This victory elevated one issue above all others:

‘One of the most important outcomes of the Karabakh Victory was the Zangezur Corridor. In my view, it is among the most critical gains of that victory.’

Although Armenia formally accepted the corridor under Russian mediation:

‘Subsequent developments unfortunately slowed the process. However, both Azerbaijan and Trkiye have repeatedly stated that they remain determined.’

This determination, he says, directly shaped current policies.

However, the Zangezur Corridor is still central to the opening of the Alican-Margara crossing. The expert explains that infrastructure and diplomacy are now moving in parallel:

‘Azerbaijan has already initiated work on the Zangezur Corridor. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has also stated that he wants good relations with Trkiye and Azerbaijan and that Armenia no longer has claims over Karabakh.’

Trkiye’s response followed swiftly:

‘Within this framework, Trkiye began constructing the Kars-Igdir-Nakhchivan railway. Construction is progressing rapidly.’

These developments made reopening border crossings logical:

‘Under these conditions, opening Armenia’s border gates-both Akyaka in Kars and the Alican crossing in Igdir-has become a rational option. Trkiye is pursuing this process in coordination with Azerbaijan.’

Still, Karabulut underlines a red line:

‘If any political development emerges that harms Azerbaijan or Trkiye, Trkiye can reverse its stance immediately and keep the borders closed.’

Building on his earlier remarks, Dr Karabulut also highlighted the economic opportunities that could emerge from reopening the border, particularly in light of the new transport and connectivity projects currently underway. In his comment, the expert was realistic about market size, but optimistic about long-term effects:

‘Armenia is not a large market-around two and a half million people, with a territory smaller than Konya. On its own, it is not economically significant.’

Yet geography matters:

‘Because Armenia borders both Trkiye and Azerbaijan, good relations would benefit Armenia most, but they would also add economic vitality to Trkiye’s border regions.’

He adds a longer-term vision:

‘If Armenia avoids repeating historical mistakes, this relationship could evolve into one between friendly states. That would accelerate regional peace, stability, and sustainability.’

Again, the corridor remains key:

‘The opening of the Zangezur Corridor should be seen as the linchpin. Once it opens, Trkiye will act much faster and more decisively in opening border gates. Most likely, the borders will open immediately afterward.’

As the discussion turned to the Zangezur Corridor, attention shifted to the wider regional and geopolitical complexities, particularly the role of Iran in shaping this emerging framework of connectivity.Karabulut introduced a broader regional perspective:

‘Another critical factor is Iran. Iran was initially slow and not fully constructive regarding Zangezur, which may have contributed to increased American involvement later.’

If Tehran adjusts its approach, new possibilities emerge:

‘In the long term, regional railway networks could be developed. A comprehensive regional development corridor could be established-such as Tabriz-Erzurum-Trabzon railways, or even extending lines from Tabriz eastward toward Pakistan.’

Such projects, he argued, would have global implications:

‘This would create a regional development corridor of rail networks. Regional and global economies would benefit from the resulting stability and connectivity.’

In conclusion, the economic expert underscored Azerbaijan’s growing strategic significance amid rising global demand for security, highlighting what this evolving role means not only for the country itself but also for the broader balance of power among regional actors.

‘This corridor would also guarantee the secure transportation of Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas to Europe and beyond. Stability here is essential for Azerbaijan’s energy links with Europe.’

Even Russia, he noted, would not be excluded:

‘Russia is a major regional power and would also benefit from political and economic developments in the region.’

He concluded with a clear takeaway:

‘In short, this is not a zero-sum game. There would be many winners, not losers.’

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev arrived in the Republic of Serbia on an official visit on February 15, AzerNEWS reports.

A guard of honor was lined up for the President of Azerbaijan at Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport.

President Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva were welcomed by President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic.

Footage of President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Germany was posted on his social media accounts, AzerNEWS reports.

The post reads:

“Official visit of President Ilham Aliyev to the Federal Republic of Germany (13-15.02.2026)”.

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva, who are on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, visited the monuments of National Leader Heydar Aliyev and prominent Serbian writer Milorad Pavic in Tašmajdan park in Belgrade on February 15, AzerNEWS reports.

The Munich Security Conference (MSC) has long been a barometer of Western anxiety. This year, it felt closer to a post-mortem. And ever since the 2026 iteration of MSC, the stage itself is beginning to splinter further on the idea regarding the friction of a multipolar world.

From the opening evening, the tone was unmistakable. What usually begins as a cautious exchange of warnings instead opened with a blunt diagnosis: the international system that once structured expectations, alliances, and restraint is no longer functioning as assumed. The remark landed not as provocation, but as recognition. In Munich, the audience did not argue with the premise; they absorbed it. We have indeed entered the gloomily described ‘wrecking ball’ era of diplomacy, as it has been said.

That reaction alone says much about the moment. For years, the conference has catalogued risks, Russian revisionism, American unpredictability, and Chinese economic leverage, but always within the implicit belief that the old framework, however strained, would somehow endure. This time, the language shifted. The issue was no longer erosion but absence. The skepticism made its strong comeback with the Gaza crisis, reached the climax when the order failed to come up with an idea of resolution for the Russian-Ukrainian war for several years, and when US forces captured Maduro, it might have fallen into pieces.

The conference report mirrored this mood. Its central message was not simply that the system is under pressure, but that the pressure is coming from both outside and within. External challengers matter, but internal decay, loss of trust, hollowed institutions, and declining enforcement of rules have become just as decisive. Order, it suggested, is not being overthrown so much as quietly abandoned.

That idea framed much of what followed. Europe, in particular, is grappling with the realization that its security assumptions were built on habits rather than guarantees. The notion that alliances automatically translate into protection is being inverted. Now the question is what Europe itself must contribute – politically, industrially, militarily, to keep those alliances credible at all.

This recalibration was evident in the interventions from Berlin and Paris. Friedrich Merz spoke of the end of the unipolar moment and the return of power politics, stressing that even the strongest partners can no longer afford strategic solitude. Emmanuel Macron went further, arguing that European security can no longer be defined by watching the gestures of others. In both cases, the message was less about defiance than about maturity: dependence has become a liability.

Behind the rhetoric lies a concrete debate about capability. Strategic autonomy is no longer an abstract slogan in Brussels; it is increasingly a budget line. Joint procurement, accelerated arms production, shared standards, and long-term commitments, especially in relation to Ukraine, are now framed as prerequisites rather than ambitions. Yet the obstacles are obvious. Diverging threat perceptions between Europe’s eastern and southern flanks, limited industrial capacity, and the absence of a shared command culture all threaten to keep strategy on paper.

Ukraine sits at the center of this transformation. The war is no longer treated as an isolated crisis but as a formative test case for whatever security architecture emerges next. Volodymyr Zelenskyy used Munich to emphasize joint production and resilience, highlighting cooperation not as charity but as shared deterrence. The symbolism was deliberate: security, in the new era, is something that must be built together, or not at all.

Hovering over all these discussions was Washington’s recalibrated tone. The message from the American side was measured but unmistakable: alliances endure through burden-sharing, not habit. For Europe, accustomed to treating American commitment as a constant, even a subtle shift carries strategic weight. The mere uncertainty over whether the umbrella will fully open is enough to induce panic in some capitals.

It is here that the Munich debate intersects with a broader global conversation. The paralysis of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations, was a recurring subtext. Their inability to prevent wars or enforce norms has reduced them to forums of rhetoric rather than instruments of order. This vacuum is being filled unevenly, through ad hoc coalitions, bilateral deals, and transactional politics.

From outside the Western core, this diagnosis sounds familiar. Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, has repeatedly argued that states are being forced to rethink security and cooperation precisely because international institutions no longer function as intended. During his interview with Azerbaijani media, he said this:

“More and more countries are already realizing that they need to reconsider their approach with respect to intergovernmental relations, security, and the functioning of international institutions. We see that the United Nations is totally paralyzed; it will not influence any of these issues. And there is no alternative. Hopefully, we will see more common sense in working together, because the new world order should not mean that ‘whoever is stronger is right.’ The new world order should mean new mechanisms for a civilized world, new forms of relations, and a new international order.”

Munich offered no blueprint for such a framework, yet. The old order still supplies the language of legitimacy, but no longer commands obedience. The new one remains unnamed, its contours visible only in fragments, energy security debates, supply-chain geopolitics, defence-industrial coordination, and technological rivalry.

This ambiguity is both dangerous and fertile. Delay risks fragmentation, strategic drift, and repeated crises managed on the fly. But acceleration, through joint production, clearer commitments, and political coherence, could produce a more balanced transatlantic relationship rather than a broken one.

In that sense, the 2026 Munich Security Conference may not be remembered as the “Last nail on the coffin”, but as a rehearsal, awkward, unfinished, and unsettling, for what comes next. The danger is not that the so-called coffin has been sealed. It is that Europe, and perhaps the wider international community, still hesitates to decide what should replace it.

In his last annual assessment before elections, the Hungarian prime minister promised to take action against ‘Brussels agents.’ He praised his party’s achievements and accused his political opponents of wanting to be the viceroy not only of Brussels but of multinational corporations, AzerNEWS reports.

“The 21st century will be the century of humiliation for Europe,” the Hungarian Prime Minister began his traditional annual assessment speech at Várkert Bazár, after his introduction. Orbán said that, for the first time since the invention of the steam engine, Europe is not part of the world’s transformation, but he believes Hungary has a chance to come out of it well.

“They have done ‘half a job’ in ousting Brussels agents”

Referring back to his speech last year in which he predicted that the Hungarian government, as an ally of Donald Trump, would be on the “main street of history” while their political opponents “wander down muddy side streets,” Orbán said all that had come true.

He argued that the US president had carried out a revolution against the former liberal elites, and that Hungary had joined him and that this is why he had said a year earlier they would oust from Hungary those NGOs, opposition newspapers and judges who had been labelled “bugged” by Orbán, and who had been classified as foreign agents by the government.

“That was the plan, but I have to admit that we have only done half the job: the Brussels repressive machine is still at work in Hungary, and we will clean it up after the April elections. Disguised civil organisations, bought journalists, judges, politicians, algorithms, bureaucrats, rolling Euro-millions – that’s what Brussels means here in Hungary today.”

He did not mention from his last year’s speech that he promised an economic recovery and significant growth, the so-called “flight to recovery”, which turned out to be 0.3% growth in 2025, or that after promising to ban ‘Pride Day’, hundreds of thousands of people turned up and celebrated in Budapest, despite the ban.

However, Orbán highlighted welfare measures introduced immediately before the 2026 elections and those promised for later. He said the source for these measures will be a system of special taxes on big business.

Orbán introduced the phrase ‘Putining’

“We must come to terms with the idea that those who love freedom should fear Brussels and not the East, and cast their anxious eyes on Brussels,” the Hungarian prime minister underlined.

“Putining is primitive and frivolous,” Orbán said, by which he portrays the Western practice of framing Russia and Putin as a threat. “Brussels is a tangible reality and a direct threat,” he added.

The Hungarian prime minister deduced this from a US report stating that the European Commission had put pressure on social media providers to “censor” content, including during European Parliament elections, in Romania and Moldova.

Orbán said that America’s friendship should be appreciated because, in his view, the United States is currently exposing the European Commission’s “censorship”.

The adversary has been bought not only by Brussels but also by global big business

The prime minister said Hungarian domestic rivals are puppets, but not only in Brussels’ hands.

After the Tisza Party presented several of its leading experts who could play an important role in a possible Tisza government, Viktor Orbán also referred to their former employers in his speech.

“One of the main winners of the war is Shell”, Orbán referred to the former job of István Kapitány, Tisza’s candidate for economic leader. According to him, Shell made tens of billions of dollars from the war, and their aim is to cut Hungary off from Russian oil.

In fact, a sanctions regime of this kind was introduced by Donald Trump’s administration, and Hungary was given a one-year reprieve. Moreover, the two biggest winners in the Russia-Ukraine war are the Hungarian national oil company MOL, which has made significant profits from buying cheap Russian oil, as it is exempt from European and US sanctions for the time being.

The Hungarian prime minister also mentioned ERSTE Bank, where another Tisza economist, András Kármán, had worked. According to the prime minister, ERSTE wants to plant its agent in the Tisza government in order to get the special banking taxes out. Kármán was state secretary in the second Orbán government between 2010-14.

Europe is going to engage in war, Orbán claims

“Europe has decided to go to war by 2030. This will be the last election before war,” the Hungarian prime minister said. “Brussels has decided to defeat the Russians in Ukraine, and outside Hungary, war is being prepared everywhere in Europe.”

Orbán also said that Europe is arming itself and sending instructions to the population on what to do in the event of war, while sending Ukraine a lot of money on credit.

“Ukraine is just swallowing money,” the Hungarian prime minister said. “No one can answer the question of how to defeat a nuclear power without using its nuclear weapons.”

Orbán stressed that Hungary would not send money or weapons to Ukraine, and that Hungarian young people would not be taken to Ukraine, although NATO’s charter does not require member states to use military force in the event of a conflict.

An Indian man pleaded guilty on Friday to .S. criminal charges that he orchestrated a failed Indian government-backed plot to kill a Sikh activist in New York , in connection with what U.S. and Canadian authorities have called a broader effort to target Indian dissidents, AzerNEWS reports via CBC.

Nikhil Gupta, 54, pleaded guilty to murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

U.S. prosecutors accused Gupta of plotting with an Indian government official to kill Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a dual U.S.-Canadian citizen and lawyer at Sikhs for Justice in New ?York, who has advocated for a sovereign Sikh state in northern India.

India’s government has dissociated itself from any plot against Pannun, saying it was against government policy.

The discovery of alleged assassination plots against Sikh activists in the U.S. and Canada has tested relations with India, which has also denied involvement in such plots.

In June 2023, Hardeep Singh Nijjar was gunned down in Surrey, B.C., a crime that then-prime minister Justin Trudeau would later allege involved the Indian government.

Nijjar’s killing was referred to in the Gupta case, with Nijjar identified as an associate of the victim in the planned killing in the U.S. that Gupta had been trying to arrange.

Gupta to face sentencing in May

Gupta entered his plea before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn in Manhattan federal court.

“I agreed with another person to have another individual ?to murder a person in United States” and paid someone in New York $15,000 to commit the crime, Gupta said, according to a transcript of his plea hearing.

Gupta has been jailed in Brooklyn, N.Y., since his June 2024 extradition to the U.S. from the Czech Republic, where he had been arrested a year earlier. His sentencing is scheduled for May 29, court records show.

His lawyers did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C., did not immediately respond to separate requests for comment.

Prosecutors said an Indian government ?official, Vikash Yadav, recruited Gupta in May 2023 to orchestrate Pannun’s assassination, with Gupta telling Yadav about his involvement in international narcotics and weapons trafficking.

According to court ?papers, Yadav arranged through dealings that Gupta brokered to pay $100,000 US to a purported hitman, who was actually an undercover officer ?for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, to assassinate Pannun. Gupta and Yadav arranged to have $15,000 in cash delivered to the undercover ?officer ?as an advance payment for the murder, court ?papers show.

Prosecutors said Yadav was employed by India’s Cabinet Secretariat, which houses the country’s foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis ?Wing.

He faces the same criminal charges ?as Gupta but is not in U.S. custody. It is unclear whether Yadav has hired a defence lawyer.

“Nikhil Gupta plotted to assassinate a U.S. citizen in New York City,” the U.S. Attorney for Manhattan, Jay Clayton, said in a statement. “He thought that from outside this country he could kill someone in it without consequence, simply for exercising their American right to free speech. But ?he was wrong.”

In line with the training plan for 2026 approved by the Minister of Defense, Colonel General Zakir Hasanov, the military oath-taking ceremonies for new recruits were held across the Azerbaijan Army on February 15, AzerNEWS reports.

The oath-taking ceremonies were declared open after the battle flags were brought to the parade grounds in accompaniment of military bands.

The ceremonies commenced with a tribute to the National Leader Heydar Aliyev, and Martyrs, who sacrificed their lives for the Motherland. The National Anthem of the Republic of Azerbaijan was performed.

The new recruits solemnly took the military oath and pledged to be loyal to the Motherland.

Representatives of the Ministry of Defense and commanders of military units delivered speeches, congratulating the new soldiers on the occasion of this significant day. They recommended them to remain loyal to the Motherland, the state, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, as well as to their military oath, to continuously enhance their combat readiness, to execute the orders and instructions of their commanding officers accurately and in a timely manner, and to be prepared at all times to defend the territorial integrity of the country.

Parents of the new soldiers who also addressed the gathering expressed their pride in their sons’ honorable service to the Motherland and conveyed their gratitude to the Head of State, as well as to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, for the conditions created for the servicemen.

The ceremonies ended with servicemen’s solemn marches in front of the grandstand.

Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces Major General Seyed Abdolrahim Mousavi stated on Sunday that should the United States engage in war with Iran, this would serve as “a lesson for [US President Donald] Trump.”

“If Trump intends to go to war, why is he talking about negotiations?” Mousavi asked during a ceremony.

“If Trump intends to go to war, why is he talking about negotiations?” Mousavi asked during a ceremony, further adding that his comments are “not worthy of a president and are frivolous.”

Mousavi went on to say that the lesson Iran would deliver would stop Trump and Washington from “causing [further] trouble in the world.”