Uganda’s fragile democratic experiment is once again under siege. The proposed amendment to Section 8 of the Administration of Parliament Act-championed by Buyaga West County Member of Parliament (MP) Dennis Namara-threatens to dismantle the very architecture that has kept the Opposition relevant in Parliament.
Critics say by shifting the power to appoint the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament (LoP) from the largest Opposition party to a vote among all Opposition MPs and Independents, Mr Namara’s Bill risks turning the Opposition aisle into a fragmented marketplace of competing interests. What looks like reform may in fact be, they add, the quiet removal of the last institutional guardrail against illiberal democracy.
For decades, the position of LoP has been more than symbolic. It has provided coherence, accountability, and a focal point for dissent in a system otherwise dominated by the ruling party. The current arrangement ensures that the largest Opposition party-often the only one with the organisational capacity to challenge government excesses-can speak with authority. Mr Namara’s proposal would upend this logic, replacing clarity with contestation.
Supporters of the amendment argue that it democratises Opposition politics. By allowing Independents and smaller parties to participate in the selection of the LoP, they claim, it breaks the monopoly of entrenched Opposition parties and creates space for new voices. In theory, this could empower marginalised groups and foster a more inclusive Opposition. Yet the practical effect may be quite different.
Mr Job Kiija, the associate director at Innovations for Democratic Engagement and Action (IDEA), warns that the proposed amendment to Section 8 of the Administration of Parliament Act fundamentally twists the meaning of political inclusivity.
‘What Dennis Namara and his Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU) colleagues present as reform-allowing all Opposition and Independent MPs to elect the LoP-is, in reality, a pretext to dilute party mandates. It disenfranchises voters who deliberately chose the largest Opposition party, currently the National Unity Platform, to lead the alternative government. In a multiparty system, true representation rests on the principle that electoral strength translates directly into legislative leadership,’ Mr Kiija said.
He added: ‘This manoeuvre is not new. It mirrors the destructive precedent set by Mityana South MP Richard Lumu’s earlier legislative push-an opportunistic agenda that destabilised Speaker Anita Among’s leadership. Forcing an election across a fragmented Opposition floor will not foster inclusivity; it will manufacture a compromised leader lacking a genuine mandate from the anti government electorate.’
Transactional politics
Mr Kiija said from a governance perspective, the proposal acts as a structural wedge designed to fracture Opposition unity. A robust, autonomous Opposition is not a constitutional luxury but a democratic necessity.
‘Transforming the LoP into an electoral prize contested among rival factions and Independents institutionalises internal competition at the expense of national oversight. Instead of consolidating energy to hold the ruling National Resistance Movement accountable, Opposition parties will be forced inward-engaging in transactional politics and state influenced horse trading. The result is a crippled opposition, unable to mount disciplined checks on government policy or committee oversight,’ he said.
Mr Kiija further noted that the PLU backed push tilts power away from independent parties and into the hands of external political military movements aligned with the ruling establishment.
‘With the NRM’s commanding majority and influence over independents, any ‘opposition election’ will be vulnerable to manipulation. Allowing the governing establishment to dictate how minority benches choose their leadership strips the leading opposition party of autonomy. It sets a perilous precedent where the state effectively chooses its own opponent, reducing oversight to mere theatre,’ he said.
The IDEA associate director said the proposal undermines Westminster traditions and Uganda’s constitutional foundation. Articles 71 and 72 guarantee multiparty autonomy, including the right of parties to designate their own parliamentary leadership.
‘The Westminster model dictates that the largest non governing party forms the official opposition as a coherent government in waiting. Bypassing this practice erodes party discipline and independence. It signals a dangerous slide toward a de facto single party state disguised as parliamentary majoritarianism,’ Mr Kiija said.
The expert said the PLU, which backs Mr Namara, stands to gain the most. Although not the largest Opposition party, PLU could leverage alliances with Independents to secure leadership positions. This would weaken the established Opposition and hand the ruling party a fractured adversary. A divided Opposition is easier to co opt, easier to silence, and far less capable of mounting a unified challenge to executive dominance.
Uganda’s political system has long relied on the Opposition as a counterweight to unchecked power. Removing the largest party’s prerogative to appoint the LoP risks turning Opposition leadership into a transactional contest, vulnerable to manipulation and patronage. What is presented as democratisation may instead be a Trojan horse: a reform that appears inclusive but ultimately dismantles meaningful dissent.
A seismic change
Mr Namara, backed by PLU-leaning MPs, has formally notified the Clerk of Parliament of his intention to introduce the Private Members’ Bill. The PLU, born out of the MK Movement, has steadily evolved from civic mobilisation into a political force. Its rhetoric of patriotism and anti corruption has attracted MPs numbering in their hundreds. Announcing its new office bearers this week, the pressure group showed that it has a strong presence not just in the ruling NRM but also among the Independents.
Renowned political analyst and researcher, Yusuf Serunkuma, argues that the PLU is gambling with how to take power, adding that the problem is that they are relying on small, fragmented initiatives.
‘There is no clear ideological direction, and instead, everyone appears to be following the random ambitions and power flexes of Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba,’ he noted. ‘Whatever changes are made to [the election of the LoP] do not significantly alter the broader political landscape in Uganda.’
The academic emphasised that the LoP carries no real influence under an autocratic system. ‘We are not a democracy, and neither are we trying to build one.’
The Office of the LoP was established in Parliament at the inception of the 8th Parliament, pursuant to the constitutional provisions that restored multi-party politics in Uganda in 2005. The Office draws its existence from Article 82A of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, and Part IIA of the Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Act, 2006. The position of the LoP is equivalent to that of a Cabinet minister in government and, as such, is entitled to similar benefits and privileges.
Mr Kakuba Sultan Juma, a senior lecturer and graduate coordinator in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences at Kyambogo University, told Weekend Monitor that changing the selection of the LoP presents both opportunities and risks. He said on one hand, such a reform could enhance democratic inclusivity by giving a broader range of Opposition legislators a direct voice in choosing their leader, thereby making the LoP more representative of the diversity within the Opposition.
Conversely, Mr Kakuba said with Uganda’s Opposition landscape already fragile, any change could intensify internal competition, weaken party cohesion, and undermine the ability of the Opposition to present a united and strong front against the NRM, which has been in power for decades.
‘The effectiveness of the LoP depends not only on democratic legitimacy but also on the capacity to coordinate and mobilise Opposition MPs around common objectives,’ Mr Kakuba said.
A rape of the law?
Mr Wandera Ogalo, a lawyer who was party of the Constituent Assembly that framed the 1995 Constitution, this week told NTV Uganda that Article 82A contains two key provisions: the first introduces the multiparty system, and the second prescribes how an LoP is chosen and how they cease to hold office. Mr Ogalo emphasised that one cannot interpret these provisions in isolation.
‘Since the first provision establishes a multiparty system, any law made under the second must align with that principle,’ Mr Ogalo said.
He said the official LoP is the leader of the Opposition party with the majority of MPs in Parliament.
Mr Kakuba said regarding the motivations behind the PLU’s support for the amendment, interpretations will inevitably differ depending on one’s political perspective.
‘What is clear, however, is that the timing and context suggest strategic political interests, particularly given the prominence of NUP within the Opposition,’ he said.
In Mr Kakuba’s view, the intention is to weaken whichever party emerges as the leading Opposition force-currently NUP-so that its influence is diluted and no single party can be regarded as dominant.
Mr Joel Kuteesa Kalyamagwa, a lawyer, stated that the only circumstances under which someone can cease to be the LoP are if they resign voluntarily, lose their parliamentary seat, if the Opposition party with the largest number of MPs ceases to hold that majority, or if the LoP dies or resigns.
‘You don’t simply remove the LoP like that,’ he said. ‘That’s a rape of the law.’
The LoP office, currently occupied by the Nakawa West Member of Parliament, Joel Ssenyonyi, became operational in 2006. This was after pressure from donors forced Uganda to move from a single-party system, the Movement system, to a multi-party dispensation. Instituted under Article 82A of the 1995 Constitution, the office was introduced via the 2005 Constitutional Amendment, and operationalised by the Administration of Parliament Amendment Act, 2006.
As the law stands, Section 6B of the Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Act empowers the Opposition political party with the greatest numerical strength in Parliament to independently nominate the Leader of the Opposition. This explains why, from 2006 to 2016, when the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) was the largest opposition party, its various party presidents picked Morris Ogenga Latigo, Nathan Nandala Mafabi, Philip Wafula Ogutu, Winifred Kiiza, and Betty Aol Ochan to occupy the office in various years.
When NUP took over from FDC as the biggest Opposition party in 2021, its President Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu tipped, first, former Nyendo-Mukungwe legislator, Mr Mathias Mpuuga, and, later, Mr Ssenyonyi to occupy the office. Mr Ssenyonyi recently retained the position, with the blessing of his party’s higher-ups. Now, Mr Namara’s Bill appears intent on ending his return to the office.
Return to movement system?
Mr Namara, who represented Uganda at the East African Legislative Assembly (Eala) rationalised the need to have amendments, saying that the current system concentrates excessive authority in one political party. This, he added, undermines accountability within the multiparty political system.
‘The office of the Leader of the Opposition should be under the purview of Parliament in the execution of its mandate. At the moment, the Leader of the Opposition is effectively chosen at Kavule [NUP’s headquarters] by a few individuals without consultation with other opposition Members of Parliament,’ Mr Namara said this week.
Although Mr Namara claimed that PLU’s move is aimed at improving multiparty politics, political observers have insisted that by moving to decide on the LoP, the regime is reverting to the single-party system or the movement system.
‘I like the PLU move because from 2005, we have had this facade that we have a multiparty party system, yet we don’t have it. The PLU’s move to take over the office of the Leader of the opposition will help to remove the pretence,’ Dr Serunkuma explained, adding that Uganda will now be a full-fledged single-party system.
On paper, the movement system, officially known as the Movement Political System, which was adopted in the 1995 constitution, was marketed by President Museveni as a non-partisan, all-inclusive form of governance. Mr Museveni and his supporters claimed that, unlike political parties that were historically vehicles of division that mobilised along religious and ethnic lines, resulting in coups and political chaos, the movement system was all-inclusive.
Giovanne Carbone, a professor of political science, however, frames the movement system as something closer to a hegemonic party-state system. He says that it was neither a fully-fledged one-party state (or a situation of political monopoly) nor a three-party system (a pluralist political context), but a situation of political supremacy exercised by a single organisation, with smaller opposition groups not able, so far, to put up any significant challenge.
‘The evidence is persuasive that the Movement is a political partisan organisation driven by the aim of placing its people in positions of power, rather than, as its leaders claim, a political ‘system’ (i.e. a set of governmental institutions and relationships, including the terms of participation and competition to access such institutions,’ Carbone said.
Authoritarianism
Yet in his paper entitled New Wine or New Bottles? Movement Politics and One-Partyism Prof Joe Oloka-Onyango insists that the Movement system, claimed to be an innovative, inclusive, and ‘no-party’ form of democracy, was simply the authoritarian, one-party systems of Africa’s post-independence past repackaged.
Prof Oloka-Onyango, a former law don at Makerere University, argues that the Movement system fundamentally suppressed democratic diversity and dissent. Though the movement system claimed to operate on individual merit rather than sectarian party lines, Oloka-Onyango argues this was a facade allowing the state to operate as a de facto single-party regime, co-opting or banning all real political opposition under the guise of “national unity.’
He said it is under the movement system that the NRM effectively merged state apparatuses (like the military, police, and local councils) with the ruling organisation, making it impossible for Opposition entities to compete on a level playing field.
For Prof Oloka-Onyango, the movement system became a tool to co-opt individual members of historical parties, like the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and Democratic Party (DP), while neutralising their institutional power.
Just like the Movement system, the PLU has framed the idea of choosing the LoP as part of its endeavours to ensure inclusivity of all parties in Uganda.
‘A Leader of Opposition in and parliamentary Commissioners decide the welfare of the MPs, Parliamentary staff, and offer strategic leadership for Parliament. Whereas other Members of the Commission, like Speaker and Deputy Speaker, are voted by MPs and whereas other members of the Commission, like Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, are vetted by Parliament, you have a[n] LoP who is self-accounting. This business of a few individuals sitting in Kavule or Najjanankumbi to decide on how parliament is governed must stop,’ Mr Namara said, adding that if parliament removes a president and all Ministers and the speaker of parliament why should it be impossible for parliament to remove a Leader of Opposition?
‘Because if you have leaders who can’t be checked, it breeds impunity,’ Mr Namara responded to his question.
Legal question
Legal analysts haven’t doubted PLU’s ability to push this amendment quickly through Parliament, if anything, because the House Speaker, Jacob Marksons Oboth, alias Oboth-Oboth and Deputy Speaker Thomas Tayebwa are all in their positions because of the entity. The questions that have emerged are around whether the law will work retrospectively, such that they remove Mr Ssenyonyi from office.
In principle, laws fundamentally operate prospectively, meaning they apply only to actions and events that occur after the legislation goes into effect.
‘The suggested PLU bill is a fool’s errand, a wild goose chase. The right to freedom of association-the basis of multiparty democracy-includes the right not to associate. Ugandan parliament has no power to direct a merger of opposition political parties or independents,’ said Uganda Law Society President, Isaac Kimaze Ssemakadde.
Yet the notion of bringing every Ugandan under the framework of PLU has been made clear. During the handover party of PLU’s leadership from Daudi Kabanda to Tingey county legislator, Fadil Twalla, Speaker Oboth-Oboth made this vision clear.
‘I believe every Ugandan should belong to PLU,’ Mr Oboth-Oboth, who was the chief guest at the function, said.
Speaker Oboth-Oboth appears to have been taking a leaf from Gen Muhoozi, who has made it clear that there is a military operation to get rid of those opposed to the regime.
‘Our operations against the Opposition last week are a reassurance to the great Ugandan people by the security forces that Uganda will never be led or controlled by a foreign-sponsored political organisation,’ Gen Muhoozi said.
Back to the future
Yet it is not just under the NRM where Uganda has been ruled in a single-party format, because in 1964, the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) declared Uganda a single-party state during the leadership of Apollo Milton Obote. In the initial announcement of 1964, Obote declared the UPC’s intention to create a one-party socialist state. Nevertheless, Obote escalated matters in 1969 by banning all Opposition political parties following an assassination attempt on his life.
When Idi Amin ousted Obote in a coup, he reinforced this ban on political parties and parliament through a decree. Just like Museveni argued against political parties, Amin rationalised his move to kick out political parties, claiming that they were inherently rooted in ethnic division and religious sectarianism, which he blamed for the violence and instability that plagued post-independence Uganda. This ban effectively removed all political opposition and allowed Amin to rule by military decree and bypass any democratic accountability.
When the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) installed Godfrey Binaisa as president in August 1979, his administration imposed a ban on political parties, believing that with such a ban Uganda would avoid “the politics of religion, sectarianism, rivalry and hatred’, and be able to work for and even achieve the politics of consensus. Binaisa was ousted by pro-Obote forces within the military structures, leading to the return of the multiparty dispensation under which the contested 1980 elections took place, with Obote controversially declared victorious.
Obote’s win forced Mr Museveni to wage a five-year war in the Luweero jungles, and once he took to the streets of Kampala, he once again banned political parties. Mr Museveni claimed that Ugandans were being ruled under what he termed a broad-based government. Yet Dr Kizza Besigye, in his dossier when he was parting with the NRM, insisted implementing the broad- based system was a myth since there were ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’
‘Historical NRM politicians who thought that they were not ‘appropriately’ placed in government, blamed this on the large number of the ‘non-NRM’ people in high up places, and set out to campaign against the situation. They created a distinction between government leaders as ‘NRM’, and ‘broad-based.’ If you were referred to as ‘broad-based’, it was another way of saying that you were undeserving of your post, or that you were possibly an enemy agent (‘5th Columnist’),’ Dr Besigye wrote in 1999.