As is the wont, the campaigns have reached the stage where the NRM government of HE Yoweri Museveni goes into the ‘warning stage.’ In the days when he was much younger, Museveni would wear his military fatigues and send a stern warning ‘to those intending to destabilise Uganda’ that they would ‘end up six feet below.’
This show of bravado happens when threatened, especially by huge crowds that follow the Opposition. Over the years, opposing Museveni and NRM’s hold on power, has been made to appear like treason or an affront on the state of Uganda. The panacea is a military response. Here, the army and what over time appear like their bridesmaids, the police, and in some cases, ‘unknown’ stick-wielding lumpens are deployed.
Any iota of suspicion, real, imagined, or fabricated, leads to arrest, abduction, torture, jailing, and a long-drawn-out legal process that rarely ends in a conviction.
The greatest strength of the ruling NRM for the last 40 years has been its portrayal as the ultimate invincible force. One with a military backing and a successful violent past to warn its contenders.
Wherever there is contention -even a traders’ strike, the instruments of coercion, also known as ‘our army,’ are deployed.
Increasingly, the main Opposition party, National Unity Platform (NUP) and its leader, Robert Kyagulanyi Sentamu, widely known as Bobi Wine, has been warned about reckless statements intended to destabilise Uganda.The military and the police have violently broken up rallies and beaten up their supporters as seen in videos. The latest is the gruesome encounter coming out of Gulu.
There are allegations that the Uganda police and the military, acting on ‘credible intelligence,’ are forestalling anticipated chaos that intends to turn Uganda to the dark old days, the NRM saved it from, in 1986.
The allegations against NUP of illegal drilling, the adoption of attire mimicking a military outfit, complete with pips, boots, and a red beret, are used as proof of mobilisation for war. It is made worse by the call by its leaders to protect the vote and demand victory after the election in case it is ‘stolen’.
Is there a possibility that NUP would go to war to contest the election like Museveni after the 1980 election? If at all it happened, it would be a very tall order for them. The circumstances in 1981 when Museveni went to the bush are different from what prevails at the moment.
In 1981, Uganda was fresh out of the anti-Amin war of 1979. The state had collapsed in all aspects. It was just building a new national army, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). The economy had collapsed and had challenges in funding a war. The UPDF has been around for 40 years. It is much larger, better equipped, and has a stronger economy to fund a war. In fact, most of the economy is now in the hands of foreign interests and other global capital interests.
They would either fund the government war effort or black list the Opposition to protect their investment. Additionally, it is hard to see how global powers would sit by and watch Uganda being destabilised in the volatile Great Lakes region. There is a need to have a stable Uganda as a gateway to the rare earth minerals in the explosive DR Congo.
South Sudan is perennially on the brink of war. So is Burundi. Rwanda has issues with the DR Congo. Kenya and Tanzania are on tension caused by the rise of the Gen Z after contentious elections.
In 1981, the command and control of the UNLA was weakened by ethnic division between the Acholi and the Lango. It was what eventually brought it down and helped the rebels when Maj Gen Oyite Ojok died and was replaced by Brig Smith Opon Achak.
UPDF has its command and control firmly in the hands of groups associated and very close to the President. His son, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is the Chief of Defence Forces. They have a vested interest in keeping him in power, and they have never shied away from saying it publicly.
The same applies to the public service, financial, social, and many other sectors. They can watch the movement of people, money, goods, and services in the economy and country to frustrate the funding of subversive activities. That way, you limit rebels using fake travel documents.
You avoid a repeat of the tales in the 80s of bank headquarters in Kampala, transferring huge sums of money to branches where the rebels would easily break in and steal them.
The hospitals can take note of people with gunshot wounds, reporting for treatment and trace them to a rebellion.
The NRM allegedly had many contact doctors who treated wounded rebels in government hospitals and others who would divert government medical supplies to the war effort. You contain all this to the detriment of the rebels if ‘your people’ are in place. Secondly, unlike today, by 1981 the NRM found a central government of Uganda that was ‘besieged.’ It was already being fought by the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) of Yusuf Kironde Lule, the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) of Andrew Lutaakome Kayiira, Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) of then Brig Moses Ali and other remnants of the defeated Uganda Army of the Idi Amin era. NUP would not have that advantage.
The leaders of the opposition of 1981 were young men who believed in the lofty Eastern ideologies of Marxism and creating egalitarian societies. They, including Museveni, hardly had any material possessions to protect or worry about as they went to war. The leaders of the current opposition, including Bobi Wine, are encumbered by wealth, family, businesses, and other assets. These risk being targeted by the government in case they take up arms.
The NRM has also made elective political office very lucrative. It is now the ultimate goal of any politician, be they in the government or the Opposition. The struggle of today is to win an elective political office and keep it at all costs. The cost includes being compromised by the very government they purportedly are fighting to remove. That opens the door to infiltration and divulging of secrets, something that weakens a war effort easily.
The war of 1981 to ’86, especially in Buganda, left a lot of destruction of human life, the economy and material possessions in its wake. It later spilled over in the north and north eastern Uganda were the people endured two decades of untold suffering. The far-reaching consequences were that the people became poorer and weakened as a result of war. Most have been forced to sell their land to survive. They can hardly finance another war or risk the lives of their children as they did for the NRM in Buganda.
The fact that after all the sacrifices made for the success of the NRM, most of the things that were touted as the motives for the war are still alive. Some conditions are even worse. The corruption, bad elections, abduction, torture, and the lack of due process. The absence of or poor social services like schools, hospitals, housing, and roads. The irony is that the justification of the NRM’s war has taught the people not to trust those promising a better tomorrow by resorting to war.
Lastly, in 1981, Museveni found fertile ground in Buganda because there was almost total hatred for President Milton Obote. He had allegedly stolen an election won by a Muganda Paul Ssemogerere.
Today, Museveni still has some support in Buganda. The area is also home to many migrants, and it is no longer purely an area inhabited by Baganda. On this note, Bobi Wine would not have the same advantage as Museveni in 1981.