The High Court has interdicted the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against its agent Pulane Kgoadi, pending the filing of substantive proceedings to challenge the process.
The interim interdict was granted by Judge President Reiner Busang this week. Kgoadi had approached the court on an urgent basis following a directive that her disciplinary hearing would proceed on 24 October 2025 ‘with or without’ her, despite the fact that the charge sheet against her had been withdrawn earlier in the month.
The court found that it was ‘common cause’ that the disciplinary board withdrew the charge sheet on 6 October 2025 and that no substitute charge sheet had been issued or served thereafter. Despite this, DIS directed that the disciplinary hearing should continue.
In assessing urgency, the court stated that ‘the fundamental objectives of urgent applications is to avert or minimize the impact of harm which cannot be repaired after the fact.’ Judge Busang found that the insistence by DIS that the hearing should proceed in the absence of a charge sheet justified urgent court intervention.
‘This court finds that the application is urgent having regard to the board’s insistence to proceed with the disciplinary hearing with or without the Applicant in the absence of a charge sheet,’ Busang found.
The court accepted Kgoadi’s submission that the withdrawal of the charge sheet meant that ‘there existed no valid, extant or legally operative charges’ against her. In this context, the court held that the jurisdiction of a disciplinary board is dependent on the existence of a charge sheet.
‘In my view the board’s jurisdiction to convene a disciplinary hearing is derived from the charge sheet and in its absence there is no basis for the existence of the board because it would be seized with nothing,’ the court held.
DIS had argued that the matter was not urgent, that the urgency was self-created, and that Kgoadi had alternative remedies available to her. These submissions were rejected. The court found that the application was based on a ‘new set of facts in relation to events of October 2025,’ including the service and withdrawal of the charge sheet and the scheduling of the hearing dates.
The court also took note of Kgoadi’s complaint that, while on suspension, she was prohibited from contacting DIS employees, including potential witnesses and colleagues who could assist her at the disciplinary hearing. The suspension letter expressly forbade her from contacting any DIS employee, despite the applicable disciplinary code providing that an accused officer ‘should be accompanied and assisted at the disciplinary hearing by a fellow employee.’
‘The suspension letter rendered that impossible and the board did not deem it fit to ensure compliance with the code,’ the court noted.
In addressing the scope of relief, the court expressly stated that it would not grant final orders. ‘I shall confine this judgment to interim orders because there is no legal basis for granting final order on the facts of this case,’ Busang said, adding that it would be ‘wrong and legally untenable’ to grant final relief while disciplinary proceedings were still pending.
The court then turned to the requirements for an interim interdict, namely ‘a clear right, and injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, the absence of a sufficient protection and the balance of convenience.’
On the issue of rights, the court held: ‘The Applicant’s clear or prima facie right is not contested by the DIS and I am satisfied that a case has been made in that regard.’
The court found that Kgoadi had demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of injury arising from being subjected to a disciplinary hearing without a charge sheet and without compliance with the disciplinary code. It rejected DIS’s argument that Kgoadi could simply challenge the outcome of the disciplinary process later.
‘The submission is untenable because the board has already directed that disciplinary proceedings should go ahead without a charge sheet and the assistance of a colleague contrary to the provisions of the code,’ the court ruled.
The court further held that allowing the process to continue could result in harm that could not be adequately remedied after the fact. ‘If the process were to be allowed to go ahead and she is found guilty and dismissed from employment she would be left without a sufficient legal protection, because no legal remedy would compensate her or remedy the stigma that is associated with dismissal even if the dismissal was to be reversed on review.’
On the balance of convenience, the court found in favour of Kgoadi, noting the history of the matter and the length of her suspension. ‘It is the Applicant whose suspension has adversely affected her professional standing and integrity for a period of almost two years whilst the DIS on the other hand shall suffer no prejudice if the status quo is maintained,’ the court said.
In conclusion, the court granted an interim interdict restraining DIS from proceeding with the disciplinary hearing against Kgoadi ‘pending the filing of the substantive action to set the hearing aside as a nullity upon the expiry of thirty (30) days of this order.’