Category: Sunday Standard

Botswana’s diamond industry showed tentative signs of recovery in 2025 after a difficult year marked by weak global demand, although the sector continues to operate under pressure from high inventories and subdued prices.

Rough diamond exports climbed to about P53.9 billion in 2025, up around 23% from P44 billion in 2024, reflecting improved trading volumes as producers worked through accumulated stock and gradually increased sales.

The country’s largest producer, Debswana, the 50/50 joint venture between the Botswana government and De Beers, produced about 15.1 million carats in 2025, down from 17.9 million carats the previous year as the company continued to manage output in response to weak market uptake.

Debswana’s two operating mines, Jwaneng and Orapa, produced 14.1 million carats by the end of November, while sales reached 18.1 million carats valued at about $1.78 billion (P24 billion), slightly higher than the $1.62 billion (P22 billion) realised in the prior year, indicating that producers relied partly on inventory sales to maintain revenues.

The company remains central to Botswana’s public finances, historically providing steady monthly inflows to government through dividends, taxes and royalties. But the recent downturn in the diamond market has slowed those flows, forcing government to rely more heavily on Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenues and domestic borrowing to finance spending.

To sustain long-term production, Debswana is pushing ahead with the Jwaneng Underground Development Project, which aims to extend the life of the world’s richest diamond mine beyond the current Cut 9 pit. Development has advanced 5.3 km against a target of 4.9 km, putting the project about 9% ahead of schedule, with the mine expected to operate until around 2050. Meanwhile, the proposed Orapa Cut 3 expansion remains on hold pending a clearer outlook for diamond prices.

Beyond Debswana, the state-owned Okavango Diamond Company (ODC) sold $457 million (P6.2 billion) worth of rough diamonds in 2025, up from $425 million (P5.8 billion) the year before.

Botswana’s midstream cutting and polishing sector remained broadly stable but subdued. Diamond manufacturers were supplied with stones worth $571 million (P7.7 billion) in 2025, slightly lower than $580 million (P7.8 billion) in 2024, reflecting cautious purchasing by factories.

Exports of polished diamonds reached P7.6 billion up to November 2025, marginally down from P7.8 billion the previous year.

The country currently has 41 licensed diamond cutting and polishing firms, although several have closed operations in recent years as margins tightened. Employment in the sector stood at 2,544 workers as of January 2026.

The Ministry of Finance said the industry continues to grapple with elevated inventories, with Botswana’s diamond stockpile estimated at 12 million carats, nearly double the acceptable level of about 6.5 million carats, as producers limit supply to avoid pushing prices lower.

The National Amalgamated Local, Central Government and Parastatal Manual Workers’ Union has launched a blistering attack on President Duma Boko and the governing Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). The Union accuses Boko’s administration of intolerance, arrogance and a failure to engage democratic institutions.

The Union has released a publication titled A Clarion Crying Voice: UDC Government Failures, in which they argue that the new administration has betrayed the spirit of inclusive governance that propelled it to power in the 2024 elections.

The document claims the government has developed a leadership style characterised by hostility toward critics and the monopolisation of decision-making power.

‘The UDC government has become intolerant, arrogant and less inclusive of other critical democratic voices,’ the union states in the opening chapter of the report.

According to the union, the leadership style of the president is central to what it describes as deteriorating governance standards. The document alleges that Boko operates with an excessive sense of intellectual superiority and little willingness to accept criticism.

‘.we have continuously evidenced that this country is ruled by an angry president,’ the report states.

‘He inaptly believes that he is the most intelligent person to ever grace Botswana, so much that he can even advise himself.’ The union further claims that the president regularly dismisses input from key democratic actors including the media, business community, legislators and students.

‘He derides all the custodians of democracy; the media, Business Botswana, the legislators, the opposition parties and the tertiary students and by insinuation his party comrades in parliament and grade all as of limited intellectual pedigree,’ the report says.

The publication also criticizes the government’s approach to national decision-making, arguing that the president has failed to convene broad consultations on major crises facing the country.

Among the issues cited are rising gender-based violence, youth unemployment and economic contraction linked to declining diamond revenues.

According to the union, these challenges require collective national dialogue rather than unilateral decisions from the executive.

‘We remain shocked that under such catastrophic situations, the president remains a leader without other leaders,’ the document says.

The union goes further, warning that the current leadership approach risks eroding Botswana’s democratic traditions.

‘We are under typical African dictatorship where everything is controlled by the president except the climate,’ the publication states.

The Union also criticized what it described as opaque governance structures within the current administration. The report argues that the UDC government entered office promising transparency, participatory democracy and inclusive governance but has not lived up to those commitments. ‘It should be noted that the UDC government entered governance decreeing moral superiority, progressive governance, intellectual rigour, inclusivity, participatory democracy and consultative governance,’ the document states.

However, the union contends that the reality of governance has fallen far short of those ideals.

The report also highlights economic pressures facing the country, including high youth unemployment and a struggling economy.

According to figures cited in the document, youth unemployment reached about 43.86 percent in 2024, while the economy contracted for several consecutive quarters due to declining global demand for natural diamonds.

The union argues that such problems require inclusive policy dialogue involving multiple stakeholders.

‘All the above national pains could have warranted a progressive president to have called a democracy stakeholder meeting for idea mining and sharing,’ the report says.

To address the perceived governance failures, the union proposes the establishment of a presidential advisory think tank composed of independent experts.

The body, described in the report as a ‘laboratory of ideas,’ would provide research-based advice to guide government policy.

‘This entails the creation of a laboratory of ideas to foster thought leadership,’ the report explains.

The union says such an institution could help restore trust in leadership and improve policy formulation.

The report also calls for the adoption of what it describes as a ‘leadership value-based moral index’ to ensure ethical governance and accountability among those in positions of power.

Despite its harsh criticism, the union frames its intervention as a patriotic contribution to national debate rather than an attack on the government.

‘This clarion call therefore endeavors to amplify and operationalize critical postures of policy intents which can transform Botswana,’ the document states.

When we were undergraduates at the University of Botswana in the early 1990s, every Sunday afternoon a group of us would walk from campus to Urban Police Station outside Bontleng to go and attend BNF political rallies addressed by Kenneth Koma.

At those rallies Koma was often accompanied by his key lieutenants that included Lemogang Ntime, Paul Rantao, Lesego Toro, Maitshwarelo Dabutha, Frank Marumo, Johnson Motswarakgole and Ginger Ernest – among others.

All these were political firebrands. We looked at them as our heroes. Of course we were still fascinated by socialism and all the dreams it espoused.

Foremost among this group was Motshwarakgole. He had a way with words. Like Rantao, Motswarakgole was a councillor at Gaborone City Council.

After graduating at the university I joined Botswana Gazette as a journalist and early on in my career the editor sent me out to go and interview Motshwarakgole.

Securing the interview was easy.

And together with a photographer, we took a taxi to the village where Manual Workers Union had a very modest office – a far cry from the multi-story offices they occupy today at the high-end Gaborone CBD.

That was the first interview, and since then I have lost count of how many times I have had to interview him over and over again.

The most interesting of those was when we went out to do a profile of the man.

He told us he has had very little formal education, that he started off as a government driver at Molepolole – I think it was at Scottish Hospital, and that he has had to rely on his photographic memory to make up for what he had lacked in formal education.

He has a wealth of knowledge. And listening to him is much more precious than reading a book on Botswana’s contemporary history.

That profile of this self-made man is still available in the archives of this newspaper.

So much about the background!

This week I attended a book launch y Manual Workers Union.

It is a book that is highly critical of President Duma Boko and the UDC government.

For me the bigger story however is who was in attendance.

The BCP was well represented. This caught my attention.

Their delegation was led by none other than their Secretary General, Goretetse Kekgonegile.

He was accompanied by his political mentor, BCP vice president Taolo Lucas. Also present from the BCP were Tobias Marenga, a former trade unionist and also Mmaotho Segotso their fiery political technologist.

To my astonishment, there was nobody from the Botswana National Front.

The UDC was represented by officers from the secretariat. The UDC head honcho Patrick Molotsi was not there.

Power has a way of changing people. UDC is just over a year in power.

Before he became a Minister of State, these are the kind of events where you would expect to see Moeti Mohwasa.

He would take a bus all the way from his home village in Sefhophe or Selibe Phikwe just to attend such an event and then drive back another 500 kilometres. A sheer sign of both humility and commitment to duty.

Now he is too busy. And typical of a politician in power, he is sadly also losing touch.

He is not the only one. The situation is worse among some of his cabinet colleagues.

By any standards, the UDC has had an aberrant start to government.

They may want us to believe otherwise, but they are not magic-men.

Not so long ago, each one of them was one of us. We knew them as men of many frailties.

Now there is a big wall they are erecting between themselves and us the people.

And surprise, surprise, this also applies to vice president Ndaba Gaolathe – the man we used to think could not change.

And they are enjoying themselves, not worried by the visible differences in lifestyles between them and the people.

Lest we forget, the UDC arrived into power badly bruised by life.

Once in power there has been no respite. And they have now become very prickly, very irascible.

Events are at the moment conspiring against the UDC. It looks like power will bruise them much more than was the case with the time they spent out of it.

The economy has been their biggest enemy.

Yet still, power is making them behave rather strangely – almost like recovering drug addicts.

To be fair to them, none of them has been talking up their scale of victory, which is a sufficient indicator that they are conscious of what their victory, especially the high number of seats in Parliament actually conceals.

That is a welcome caution. That should make them want to engage not fight with Motshwarakgole.

But that caution is also a welcome sign of humility on their part.

The UDC government needs to show more humility, especially in their interactions with the public.

Thery should reduce their grand promises.

They should keep the nation on side. This means not losing the nation and making sure the nation does not lose them.

The UDC is a creation of trade unions, the media and NGOs.

It is thus wrong to treat any of these as an enemy of the UDC.

And Motshwarakgole was at the forefront of efforts to create the UDC.

I know because I was there, myself.

The UDC was created after it became clear that none of the opposition parties was strong enough to dislodge the Botswana Democratic Party from power.

Its early days yet, but it looks like the UDC government is bracing itself for a fight Motshwarakgole and the trade union he leads.

There has been noise to question his BNF bonafides.

For the UDC government, the downsides risks of fighting Motshwarakgole far outweigh the upside benefits likely to accrue from such action.

UDC leadership should strive to be elders in the room.

An assault on Motshwarakgole and Manual Workers Union will be ill-advised.

This is not just because he is a tried and tested fighter. Rather it is because he has nothing to lose.

UDC government on their part have everything to lose.

They should for that reason, climbdown.

This requires them to swallow their pride, to be humble and to let bygones be bygones.

They should resist the temptation of thinking that the fight against Motshwarakgole and his trade union is part of the godsent zeitgeist that they are building. Far from it. Or thy will find themselves swallowed by elephant traps.

They need to ask themselves a simple question – why fight somebody who naturally is on your side?

If they do that, engaging Motshwarakgole should not be so difficult for the UDC.

A new study conducted at Princess Marina Hospital has revealed a troubling reality as more than a third of cancer patients receiving treatment at he nation’s main referral hospital are battling depression.

The study, titled ‘Prevalence of depression and association with quality-of-life among oncology patients at Princess Marina Hospital, Botswana: A cross-sectional study,’ shows that this compounds the already heavy burden of disease.

It also found that 35.8 percent of oncology patients screened positive for depression. The research involved 302 patients, 28 percent of them in-patients and 72 percent out-patients.

Researchers reported that the median age of participants was 55 years with women making up 71 percent of the sample. A majority of patients which translated to 70 percent, were unemployed and had no personal income. Among those who reported earning, the average monthly income was just 29 US dollars (about P390).

‘This study reveals a high prevalence of depression among oncology patients at Princess Marina Hospital,’ the authors state. They added that; ‘Depression may greatly affect not only overall quality of life but also ultimately survival.’

The findings point to a web of hardship. Participants reported a mean pain score of four out of 10. However, those with depression experienced significantly higher pain levels, averaging six compared to four among non-depressed patients which is a statistically significant difference.

‘Pain was identified as a major factor associated with depression, affecting multiple aspects of quality of life,’ the researchers noted. They found a clear positive correlation between higher pain levels and increased depression scores.

Beyond physical discomfort, depression was shown to erode quality of life across every measured domain: physical health, psychological health, social relationships and environmental well-being. Researchers found a negative correlation between depression and quality-of-life scores, meaning that as depressive symptoms increased, quality of life declined sharply.

‘Addressing the dual challenges of cancer and depression is crucial for enhancing the quality of life of oncology patients in Botswana,’ the study says. It also states that ‘By recognising and treating depression as a critical component of cancer care, healthcare providers can mitigate its detrimental effects.’

The study also revealed surprising trends. While previous research in Botswana has shown high depression rates among people with diabetes, this study found that cancer patients with type 2 diabetes were less likely to have depression.

Similarly, no increased risk of depression was found among cancer patients living with HIV, another result that diverges from prior global research. Only one percent of participants reported a prior mental illness diagnosis, a figure the researchers suggest may reflect underdiagnosis and poor mental health screening in general care.

Importantly, being newly diagnosed with cancer emerged as a key factor linked to depression, underscoring the emotional shock and uncertainty patients face at the onset of treatment.

The prevalence rate of 35.8 percent aligns closely with the African average and mirrors findings in other countries. For example, a comparable depression rate of 39.5 percent was observed among cervical cancer patients in Korea which is a relevant comparison given that cervical cancer remains the leading cause of cancer among women in Botswana.

The researchers argue that routine mental health screening must become standard practice in oncology settings. They recommended that ‘In Botswana, PHQ-9 screening should be a routine, standard part of oncology care.’

The study also recommended that treatment must go beyond chemotherapy and surgery. It also warned that without integrating mental health care into oncology, many patients at Princess Marina Hospital will continue fighting two battles at once; one against cancer and another within themselves.

First National Bank Botswana says growth in digital services helped cushion its performance by rising funding costs and tighter liquidity across the financial sector. The bank reported profit before tax of P1.0 billion for the six months to December 31, 2025, largely unchanged from the same period the previous year, reflecting what executives described as a cautious approach in a difficult operating environment.

Chief executive Steven Bogatsu said the lender continues to see strong uptake of its e-wallet platform, which remains central to its financial inclusion strategy. E-wallet transactions rose from 8.8 million to 9.7 million during the period, a 10 percent increase. The value of those transactions climbed 15 percent to P86 million from P75 million, even as mobile money operators intensify competition in the payments space.

Bogatsu said demand for the service is being driven largely by unbanked and underbanked communities, particularly in rural Botswana.

‘Financial exclusion, especially in rural areas, continues to support growth in the e-wallet platform,’ Bogatsu said.

He added that the bank’s agent network is increasingly spread across the country, with 41 percent operating in rural areas and 51 percent in urban centres.

On the financial front, net interest income rose 15 percent to P1.4 billion, supported by a four percent increase in advances and a 100 basis point increase in the prime lending rate.

However, higher funding costs weighed on margins. Interest expenses more than doubled year on year as term deposit rates climbed from about four percent to an average of 10 percent. Non-interest income increased 47 percent to P1.3 billion, helping lift total income by six percent to P1.99 billion. The bank also increased impairment provisions to P221 million as it sought to protect its loan book against rising credit risks.

A new report by media and democracy watchdog Intelwatch has warned that Botswana’s democracy is at a ‘critical inflection point,’ as it accuses President Duma Boko of adopting hostile rhetoric that threatens press freedom despite the country’s historic political transition in November 2024.

Another media rights advocacy group, Reporters Without Borders has assigned Boko’s administration the worst score and rank compared to Festus Mogae, Ian Khama and Mokgweetsi Masisi. The 2025 World Press Freedom ranking is Botswana’s worst since Reporters Without Borders started publishing the index in 2002 under Mogae.

The Intelwatch report, which is titled A Democracy at the Crossroads: Mapping Threats to the Media in Botswana paints a picture of a media sector facing legal, economic and digital pressures even after the fall of the long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the rise of the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) under President Boko.

While the 2024 electoral victory of the UDC was widely hailed as a democratic milestone, Intelwatch says the optimism has faded.

‘The new administration’s narrative has quickly shifted from reformist zeal to media-bashing rhetoric,’ the report states. ‘Hostility from the highest office legitimises online harassment and emboldens state security agents.’

Intelwatch is a new research and advocacy organisation dedicated to supporting policy work and activism to strengthen public and democratic oversight of state and private intelligence agencies singles out Boko’s recent claims that 90% of media reports are ‘fake,’ describing the remarks as ‘unsubstantiated and deeply damaging to public trust in journalism.’

The report says Boko has also warned that journalists could face imprisonment for ‘fake news’ and criminal defamation.

‘This suggests that the specter of state hostility towards the media has not vanished with the change of government but merely changed hands,’ Intelwatch notes.

Botswana’s international standing has also suffered. According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Botswana press freedom ranking has dropped to 81st out of 180 countries in the 2025 under President Boko compared to 79th position under his predecessor former president Masisi. Botswana’s Press Freedom score under Boko also went down to 57.64 from 59.78 under Masisi. The Reporters Without Borders (RSF) total score in the World Press Freedom Index represents a quantitative measure (from 0 to 100) of the level of freedom available to journalists and media outlets in 180 countries and territories.

President Boko’s administration fared especially badly on the political indicator index, with a score of 71 down from Masisi’s 80. The RSF political indicator, a component of the World Press Freedom Index, measures the extent of state support or restriction on press freedom, including political pressure, censorship, and harassment of journalists by officials. It assesses how political authorities influence media independence, safety, and content, often tracking attacks, surveillance, and legal restrictions on journalism.

Boko however performed well on the security indicator with a score of 96 compared to Masisi’s 82. This indicator measures the risks and physical danger journalists face, evaluating threats, harassment, violence, and impunity for crimes against them. It analyzes the safety of journalists, including arrests and physical attacks, to assess overall media freedom.

Intelwatch, however, argues that the absence of mass arrests since Boko assumed office masks ‘deeper, more insidious systemic threats’ embedded in the country’s legal framework.

‘Archaic colonial-era laws such as sedition and criminal defamation remain on the statute books, ready to be weaponised,’ the report says, referencing provisions under the Penal Code that have historically been used against journalists.

The report says continued delay in enacting a robust Access to Information (ATI) law is another major concern. Without it, reporters are forced to rely on leaks rather than legally guaranteed access to public records.

‘Without structural reform and genuine political will, Botswana risks sliding from a defective democracy into a regime of information authoritarianism,’ the report warns.

Beyond legal threats, Intelwatch highlights what it terms ‘economic asphyxiation’ of independent media. Government remains the largest advertiser in the country, and the strategic withdrawal of state advertising from critical publications is described as ‘a potent tool of economic censorship.’

‘Media houses are financially anaemic,’ the report says, pointing to high operational costs, a small market and digital disruption.

The digital sphere, once seen as a haven for free expression, is also under scrutiny. Intelwatch cites credible reports that the Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) has used sophisticated forensic tools such as Cellebrite and Circles to intercept journalists’ communications and identify confidential sources.

‘This chilling reality forces journalists to adopt defensive tradecraft, hampering their ability to work freely,’ the report states.

Female journalists, in particular, face coordinated cyber-harassment campaigns, often involving gendered attacks aimed at discrediting their professional credibility.

Intelwatch argues that Botswana’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression is insufficient without explicit protections for media freedom.

‘The Constitution’s silence on specific media rights renders its guarantee largely ineffective,’ the watchdog argues.

Intelwatch says the test of democratic maturity will not lie in electoral turnover alone but in whether those in power can tolerate scrutiny.

‘The measure of this new democracy,’ the report says adding that, ‘will be its willingness to protect, rather than persecute, the messengers.’

The story of the Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital is not one of bad intentions, nor of negligence. It is the story of a highly specialised institution designed to sit at the very top of Botswana’s health system a quaternary referral and teaching platform suddenly thrust into the centre of public expectation as though it were simply another general hospital ready for walk-in demand.

In late January 2026, government communication signalled that services would be relocated to SKMTH from early February as part of a decongestion strategy for Princess Marina Hospital, including major clinical and outpatient components (Daily News Botswana, 2026a). Almost immediately, public narratives began to circulate suggesting that the hospital had ‘failed to function. Patients were reportedly turned away. Some were advised not to pay because specialist services were not yet available. Social media commentary described idle buildings filled with sophisticated machines but no visible activity. There were even suggestions that specialists were not attending to patients.

The frustration is understandable. When a loved one is ill, delay feels like indifference. When a national hospital is presented as ‘ready,’ citizens expect care not explanations.

To understand the moment, one must first understand the history.

The idea of a teaching hospital in Botswana did not emerge in 2026, nor in 2018, nor even in 2010 when construction began. It traces back to the late 1980s, when reducing reliance on externally trained specialists became a matter of strategic national concern. In 1988, government established a Presidential Task Force to examine the feasibility of developing a teaching hospital and strengthening domestic medical education capacity. By 1989, the Task Force had produced its report and recommended proceeding with the development of a national teaching platform (Republic of Botswana, 1989; Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital [SKMTH], n.d.-a).

Historical scholarship further clarifies that this process was closely linked to what was formally constituted as the Task Force on Medical Education. As part of its work, a benchmarking delegation was dispatched to study international medical training models. That delegation was led by Festinah Bakwena (Bursaries Secretary, Ministry of Education) and included Dr Edward Maganu (Deputy Permanent Secretary and Director of Health Services, Ministry of Health) and Dr Thabo Mokoena (Dean of Science, University of Botswana). Both Maganu and Mokoena are identified as members of the 1988 Task Force on Medical Education (Mgadla and Tlou, 2018).

This initiative was not about institutional prestige. It was a structural response to a human resource dilemma. Botswana required an apex institution capable of delivering advanced specialist care while simultaneously training its own future consultants.

After years of policy deliberation and alignment with the University of Botswana’s evolving medical education strategy, construction commenced in 2010 (SKMTH, n.d.-a). By 2014, core infrastructure linked to the medical school platform had been completed, and the facility’s long-term positioning as a quaternary referral and teaching institution became clearer in strategic intent (SKMTH, n.d.-a).

The facility was formerly associated with the University of Botswana teaching platform formally known as the University of Botswana Teaching Hospital and was renamed the Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital in 2018 in honour of Botswana’s second President, acknowledging his national contribution and his long service as Chancellor of the University of Botswana (SKMTH, n.d.-a).

Services were never intended to ‘switch on’ all at once. They were to be commissioned in phases. Radiology, notably, was scheduled as the first operational service line, formally opening on 1 September 2022 (The Tswana Times, 2022). The hospital also played a role in COVID-19 era arrangements, reinforcing the view that its infrastructure could support national emergencies even while broader commissioning continued (Mmegi Online, 2020). Today, SKMTH is described as a 450-bed quaternary hospital with state-of-the-art specialty and subspecialty capabilities, explicitly framed as a teaching and research platform not merely an overflow facility (SKMTH, n.d.-b).

And here lies the heart of the misunderstanding.

Botswana’s health system, like most globally, is structured in tiers. Primary care, clinics, health posts, community services is meant to be the first point of contact, absorbing routine illness, prevention, and chronic disease management (WHO, 2018). Secondary care, largely district hospitals, should handle more serious but manageable cases and referred patients. Tertiary care is where major national referral hospitals sit, intended for complex specialist referrals. Quaternary care sits at the apex: advanced subspecialties, high-end diagnostics and therapeutics, and teaching-research integration (WHO, 2010). SKMTH is officially described in exactly these terms as a quaternary hospital with education and research mandates (SKMTH, n.d.-b).

Understanding these tiers is not academic. It determines how patients should be referred and where services should be delivered. When the tiers function properly, patients move through structured referral pathways. When primary care absorbs demand effectively, tertiary hospitals are protected from congestion. When tertiary hospitals function as designed, quaternary institutions can focus on high-complexity care and training.

But when lower levels are weakened whether by medicine shortages, staffing constraints, limited diagnostics, or loss of public confidence demand flows upward. Referral hospitals become default outpatient centres. Congestion becomes structural. And no matter how many new buildings are added, absorption failures in primary and district services will simply migrate pressure to whichever facility appears most functional.

Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital was never intended to function as a walk-in general hospital. It was designed as a specialised quaternary apex platform. Expecting it to ‘instantly function’ at full capacity immediately after political messaging misunderstands how quaternary institutions operate, especially during commissioning transitions.

Hard truth number one: announcing relocation before full commissioning clarity may generate political momentum, but it also generates public expectation that governance processes have not yet fully stabilised.

Another source of public confusion has been the phrase ‘rent-a-chair,’ used online to describe specialist practice arrangements. The metaphor is emotionally potent. It suggests informality, lack of oversight, perhaps even impropriety. But specialist contracting in modern health systems bears no resemblance to salon space rental.

Globally, specialist services are frequently organised through structured contracting arrangements sessional work, fee-for-service, service-package purchasing, and credentialed practice privileges (WHO, 2010) precisely because specialist medicine is scarce, expensive to train, and variable in demand. In such models, hospitals provide the infrastructure, nursing and clinical systems, governance oversight, and patient safety standards, while specialists provide advanced expertise and assume professional responsibility for high-risk care.

Calling the model ‘rent-a-chair’ risks obscuring the real issues that matter: are services clearly commissioned with defined volumes and standards; are contracts transparent; are referral criteria communicated across the system; and is programme-based budgeting in place so the state purchases services as programmes rather than attempting to govern complex specialist care through public pressure and performance theatre?

The role of political leadership also warrants careful reflection. High-profile visits by national leaders to Princess Marina Hospital and other referral institutions can be powerful demonstrations of commitment. President Advocate Duma Boko’s surprise visit to Princess Marina Hospital in January 2026, for instance, was reported as an effort to appreciate the challenges the hospital faced, including shortages and infrastructure problems (Daily News Botswana, 2026b). These visits matter. They signal visibility.

However, the risk is that political communication can unintentionally reinforce simplistic narratives about institutional readiness. When the public discourse emphasises the presence of large machines scanners, theatres, equipment without equal emphasis on commissioning frameworks, workforce contracting, referral discipline, and operating budgets, it can produce the false belief that machines equal readiness. Machines do not treat patients. Systems do.

Hard truth number two: if leaders are not fully briefed on the operational sequencing of quaternary commissioning, they may speak with confidence while systems remain in transition. That is not a leadership failure. It is an advisory gap.

Public frustration must not be dismissed. Citizens deserve clarity, predictability, and care. But clarity must be structural. Announcements cannot substitute for commissioned services. Public pressure cannot replace contracts. Buildings cannot replace governance.

The story of Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital is therefore not a story of failure. It is a story of transition.

Botswana’s ambition is legitimate. Training its own specialists, reducing outbound referrals, building advanced care capacity these are marks of a maturing health system. But ambition must be matched with disciplined commissioning, programme-based budgeting, and referral discipline across the entire system. If primary care is strengthened, tertiary hospitals protected, and quaternary services clearly contracted and communicated, the system stabilises. If not, pressure simply migrates upward, and the public will keep re-living the same crisis in a new building.

Sir Ketumile Masire Teaching Hospital stands as a symbol of national aspiration. Whether it becomes a symbol of structural clarity or of misaligned expectation will depend not on machines, nor on headlines, but on governance quiet, technical, deliberate governance.

And governance, unlike announcements, cannot be rushed.

This commentary is offered in the spirit of constructive systems reflection and national dialogue. It does not attribute blame to individuals but seeks to clarify institutional design and governance in the interest of strengthening Botswana’s health system.

The National Amalgamated Local, Central Government and Parastatal Manual Workers’ Union has criticized the government over the appointment of Motlatsi Molapisi as presidential advisor. The union describes the move as opaque, questionable and symptomatic of broader governance failures under the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC).

In a newly released report titled A Clarion Crying Voice: UDC Government Failures, the union claims the appointment was made without public disclosure and raises serious concerns about transparency, public spending and adherence to proper government procedures.

‘As a union we are shocked that his appointment as advisor to the president was not made public,’ the report states.

The workers’ organisation says the Molapisi appointment illustrates what it sees as a growing pattern of controversial governance decisions under the current administration, which it accuses of drifting away from the reformist principles that helped propel the UDC into power during the 2024 general elections.

The union argues that the advisory position raises questions about whether the role was properly budgeted for and whether it is justified at a time when the country is grappling with high unemployment and economic uncertainty.

‘This money could pay 10 or 12 youth per month,’ the report argues.

While the Molapisi appointment forms a central focus of the union’s criticism, the report also broadens its attack to include allegations of corruption, nepotism and abandoned democratic reforms.

According to the union, the government has yet to demonstrate meaningful progress in tackling what it describes as the ‘tripartite ills’ undermining public trust in governance.

‘The UDC government has a lot to do in order to restore Batswana’s confidence on the eradication of the tripartite ills of corruption, nepotism and favouritism,’ the report states.

One of the key concerns raised by the union is the increasing use of direct tender awards without competitive bidding, a practice it argues creates fertile ground for corruption and misuse of public funds. ‘The awarding of direct tenders. has become a major point of contention and pointer to government sponsored corruption,’ the report says.

The union argues that bypassing competitive procurement processes undermines transparency and accountability in public spending. ‘This unorthodox method creates a calculated environment ripe for cronyism and misuse of public resources,’ the report warns.

The publication also points to what it describes as questionable government contracts awarded to companies with limited track records.

According to the union, one example involved a P662 million tender awarded to a company registered only months before the services were advertised. ‘This raises questions about capacity and dubious connections,’ the report states.

Critics within the union say such decisions represent a departure from the accountability and transparency that the UDC promised voters while campaigning for power.

The report argues that the ruling coalition previously criticised similar governance practices under the former administration but now appears to be repeating them. ‘Every time the UDC is cautioned about a potential corruption episode. the current government immediately justifies that by citing what the BDP did previously,’ the report states.

‘Is this not what led to people voting out BDP and replacing it with UDC?’ it asks.

Beyond procurement controversies and disputed appointments, the union has also accused the government of failing to implement key constitutional reforms that were central to its campaign platform. According to the report, the UDC’s electoral victory in 2024 was partly driven by widespread public support for constitutional reform aimed at strengthening democratic institutions.

‘Failure to trigger a comprehensive national constitutional review. is a serious miscarriage of trust to the society by the UDC government,’ the report says.

The union argues that democratic legitimacy depends on inclusive constitutional reform that reflects the will of citizens. It further emphasises that constitutionalism requires governments themselves to remain subject to the rule of law.

‘Constitutionalism simply means government that is not only a creation of the law, but is also subject to the law,’ the report states. The document warns that the failure to pursue meaningful reform risks eroding Botswana’s democratic gains accumulated over decades.

‘This is a contamination and indictment to our democracy and indeed a retrogression on the same after struggling for six decades,’ the report says.

Despite the strong language used in the publication, the union says its intervention is intended to promote accountability and safeguard public resources. The report calls for stronger anti-corruption measures, including the enforcement of asset declarations, improved whistleblower protections and enhanced oversight institutions.

‘With the continuing decline in people’s trust in public authorities, the fight against state-sponsored corruption and nepotism. has never been so important,’ the union states.

The manual workers’ union says trade unions, civil society organisations and citizens must play a central role in demanding transparency and accountability from those in positions of power. ‘The trajectory towards the elimination of corruption. requires a coordinated multi-stakeholder approach,’ the report says.

Botswana’s lucrative beef export market has suffered another blow after the European Union (EU) joined the United Kingdom in imposing restrictions on imports of fresh bovine meat from the country following an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).

In a new directive, the European Commission amended its regulations to suspend the entry of fresh meat consignments from parts of Botswana previously authorised to export to the EU.

The move follows confirmation of FMD outbreaks in cattle establishments in the North-East District. The development raised fears that the disease could spread and threaten the bloc’s animal health systems.

According to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/451, the decision was taken as a precautionary measure due to the risk of the disease entering the European Union through imported meat.

‘The entry into the Union of consignments of fresh meat of certain ungulates from the veterinary disease control zone 3c in Botswana should no longer be authorised,’ the EU states.

Botswana first notified international animal health bodies on January 28 about a suspected outbreak of the disease in cattle, which was confirmed a day later. Additional outbreaks were later detected in five more cattle establishments in the same region.

Four of those outbreaks occurred within veterinary disease control zone 3c which is an area that had previously been cleared to export beef to the EU.

The suspension effectively removes that zone from the list of areas allowed to send fresh meat to the European market.

The EU’s decision comes just weeks after the United Kingdom imposed similar restrictions.

The UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) announced in February that imports of fresh bovine meat processed on or after December 30, 2025 from Botswana would be temporarily restricted until the extent of the outbreak becomes clear.

The UK warned that the decision was necessary to protect Britain’s livestock sector.

‘Until the extent of the outbreak of disease in Botswana is clarified, imports into Great Britain of fresh bovine meat processed on or after 30 December 2025 from Botswana should be temporarily restricted,’ Defra said in a notification to veterinary authorities.

The restrictions also apply to meat shipped from Botswana but dispatched from cold storage facilities in neighbouring South Africa.

It is understood that Botswana’s beef industry, long regarded as one of the country’s key agricultural export sectors, has historically relied heavily on the European market, where its beef enjoys preferential access under trade agreements.

The EU said the amendments to its import rules were implemented with urgency due to the evolving epidemiological situation in Botswana.

The measures were adopted following consultations with the bloc’s Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed.

Reports indicate that Botswana is now under pressure to contain the outbreak quickly in order to restore export access to one of their most important international markets.

Sunday Standard open source investigation has revealed that when Botswana goes to the 2029 general election, the country’s youth electorate will be the largest in history, and the fate of Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) government may hinge on whether young people can find work.

During the election campaign, the UDC pledged to create 100, 000 jobs within its first 12 months in office and between 450,000 and 500,000 jobs within five years. So far, the first year target has not been achieved, putting pressure on the government to meet the five-year goals before voters go to the polls in 43 months.

By 2029, between 91, 000 and 139, 000 youth voters could be unemployed, depending on whether the UDC government delivers its job creation promises. That represents 21-32 percent of the youth electorate, a group that could decisively swing the election.

According to preliminary results from the Statistics Botswana 2024/25 Multi Topic Household Survey, unemployment among youth aged 15-35 is already 28.9 percent, with young women hardest hit at 30.7 percent. National unemployment stands at 21 percent. The survey revealed that unemployment among people aged 15 and above has increased from 17.6 percent in 2015/16 to 21 percent in 2024/25.

While the increase appears modest, the numbers reveal a structural shift in Botswana’s labour market. Over the past decade, Botswana’s population grew 14.2 percent ro 2.37 million. The labour force grew 21.7 percent and employment increased 16.7 percent. This means jobs are being created, but not fast enough to keep up with the number of people entering the labour market.

If current trends continue and the UDC fails to meet its job creation targets, youth unemployment could rise to 32 percent. About 139, 000 youth voters could be unemployed, representing 32 percent of the youth electorate. National unemployment could climb to 22-23 percent. This scenario would create a large economically frustrated youth voting bloc that could swing the election against government. This would mirror the conditions that contributed to the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) losing in 2024.

In 2024, youth aged 18-35 made up about 32 percent of registered voters and projections indicate that by 2029 they are expected to make up roughly 35-38 percent of registered voters. Many of them will be first-time voters entering the electorate for the first time.

In raw numbers, in 2024 about 370,000 youth voters were registered. By 2029, roughly 420, 000 – 450,000 new young voters could enter the electorate. This means the youth vote alone could be enough to swing the election.

If the definition of youth is extended to 18-39, they made up around 45 percent of registered voters in 2024 and the figure is expected to go up to 48 percent by 2029. So if you include up to 39, roughly half the electorate will be youth.

If the government successfully creates the promised 450,000 to 500,000 jobs by 2029, youth unemployment could fall to around 21 percent. About 91,000 youth voters could still be unemployed, representing 21 percent of the youth electorate. Total employment however, could rise to 1.25-1.30 million, dramatically reducing national unemployment. Although an estimated 91,000 youth voters would still be unemployed, the UDC would go to the 2029 election having delivered the largest job creation expansion in modern Botswana history.